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Chronology of the Root Mission 
{March - November, 1917) 
The dates given are according to the Western 
(Gregorian) calendar. The Western calendar was 13 
days ahead of the Russian {Julian) calendar that 
was in effect in Russia until February 1, 1918. 
The Western calendar is used throughout the text. 
March 8 Mass demonstrations in Petrograd. 
March 10 General strike, demonstrations, and blood-
shed in the capital. 
March 11 
March 13 
March 14 
March 15 
March 16 
Tsar dissolves the Duma. 
The Temporary Committee of the Duma is 
formed. 
Tsarist government is overthrown in 
Petrograd. The Temporary Committee 
assumes control of bureaucratic func-
tions. Petrograd Soviet of Workers 
Deputies is formed. 
President Wilson received Ambassador 
Francis' telegram reporting a successful 
Russian revolution. 
Tsar Nicholas II abdicates. 
Milyukov and the Soviet agree on terms 
for ruling Russia. 
Inauguration of the Provisional Government. 
; ; 
March 22 
March 27 
April 2 
April 6 
April 9 
April 10 
April 11 
April 12 
April 16 
April 24 
April 26 
April 27 
iii 
Ambassador Francis recognizes the Provi-
sional Government on behalf of the United 
States. 
Petrograd Soviet issues a call for peace 
without annexations or indemnities. 
President Wilson delivers his war message 
to Congress. 
America declares war on Germany. 
Oscar Straus suggests an American Commis-
sion to Russia. 
Colonel House suggests a commission. 
Lansing received Ambassador Francis' 
telegram warning that Russian Army is 
"precarious" and some groups are urging 
peace. Lansing conveys this to the 
President and urges a commission. Wilson 
agrees. 
The President and Lansing exchange ideas 
as to the personnel of such a commission. 
Lenin arrives in Petrograd. 
Elihu Root accepts the position of 
Special Ambassador to Russia. 
Root discusses the Mission with Wilson. 
Senator Robert LaFollette (R-Wisc.) 
attacks the selection of Root and accuses 
Root of attempting to hinder the cause of 
Russian political refugees. 
May 1 
May 2 
May 3 
May 4 
May 13 
May 15 
Mav 18 
May 20 
June 3 
iv 
Professor Milyukov's war aims note is 
published. 
Morris Hilquitt attacks the selection of 
Ambassador Root. 
Alexander Petrunkevitch suggests that 
Root is a poor choice to head the commis-
sion. Violent anti-Milyukov demonstra-
tions in Petrograd. 
Samuel Untemeyer criticizes the selection 
of Root. Petrograd demonstrations 
continue. 
Alexander Guchkov resigns as Minister of 
War and Navy. 
Milyukov resigns. Socialist Party of 
America expels Charles Russell. Root 
Mission leaves Washington. 
First Coalition government formed in 
Russia. Kerensky becomes Minister of 
War. Six socialists obtain ministerial 
posts. Prince Lvov continues as Premier. 
Root Mission sails from Seattle. 
The American Mission disembarks at 
Vladivostok. 
June 11-12 Root Mission discusses a propaganda 
campaign. 
June 13 Root Mission arrives in Petrograd. 
June 16 
v 
The American Mission is formally pre-
sented to the Provisional Government. 
First all-Russian Soviet convenes in 
Petrograd. 
June 18 Ambassador Root cables Lansing to suggest 
a major publicity campaign. 
June 21-24 Majority of Root Mission visits Moscow. 
June 22 Bolsheviks call off their planned anti-
government demonstration. 
June 26 
June 27 
July 1 
July 2 
July 5-7 
July 7 
Lincoln Steffens tells Wilson that he 
should clarify Allied war aimscnd sug-
gests public abrogation of Allied secret 
treaties. The President declines. 
Root and General Scott visit Russian 
Army Headquarters. 
William Phillips replies to Root's cable 
of June 18: The administration is con-
sidering the idea of a publicity campaign. 
The Russian offensive in Galicia begins. 
Bolsheviks win a decisive moral victory 
in mass parades in Petrograd. 
Root sends his second cable urging a 
publicity campaign. 
Petrograd Conference of Allied Ambassadors. 
Frank Polk cables Root that the publicity 
campaign is still under consideration. 
vi 
July 10 Root cables Lansing that the Mission has 
completed its work. 
July 12 Root Mission leaves Petrograd. 
July 16-17 Violent anti-government demonstrations 
in Petrograd. 
July 18 
July 21 
August 4 
August 6 
August 8 
August 21 
Provisional Government orders arrest of 
Bolshevik leaders. 
Premier Lvov resigns. Alexander Kerensky 
forms interim government. Root Mission 
arrives in Vladivostok 
Root Mission arrives in Seattle. 
Kerensky forms second coalition. 
Root Mission arrives in Washington and 
confers with Wilson and Lansing. 
The President receives the Report of the 
Root Mission. 
August 25-28 Moscow State Conference. General strike 
August 30 
in Moscow. The President's vague message 
is read to the State Conference. 
Root, Dr. Mott, and Cyrus McCormick make 
final attempt to persuade the President 
to begin a publicity campaign on Russia. 
September 9-12 Kornilov insurrection. 
October 7 Kerensky forms Third Coalition. 
October 27 President sends Edgar Sisson to Russia 
with instructions to begin a publicity 
campaign. 
vii 
November 6-7 Provisional Government is overthrown. 
No~ember 8 Soviet Inaugur~tion. 
November 25 Edgar Sisson arrives in Petrograd. 
INTRODUCTION 
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I. Introduction 
The final decision to enter World War I was made 
by President Wilson in late March, 1917, within two 
weeks of the March Revolution in Russia. With the 
entry of the United States into the world war the 
Russian war effort became a subject of great impor-
tance to the administration. Several sources close to 
the President advised him to send an American commis-
sion to Russia in order to keep that nation in the war 
and as a show of American sympathy. Wilson officially 
agreed to send a special mission on April 12, 1917. 
Neither the President nor most of his advisors 
knew or cared much about Russia prior to the spring 
of 1917. Those few who did have a knowledge of that 
country failed to achieve a satisfactory understanding 
of the revolution prior to the selection of the Root 
Mission. This failure to understand substantially 
contributed to errors in the selection of the personnel 
of the commission. Although the President was 
actively involved, secretary of State Robert .Lansing 
appears to have carried primary responsibility in the 
selection process. Choosing the right person to head 
the commission was a difficult decision that quickly 
narrowed to former Secretary of State Elihu Root, 
former President Theodore Roosevelt, and former Secre-
tary of State William Jennings Bryan. President Wilson 
ix 
chose Root because he disliked or feared Roosevelt. 
Why Secretary Bryan wasn't chosen is unknown. Both 
Roosevelt and Bryan would have been superior choices 
because of their comparatively liberal records and 
charismatic styles. Difficult decisions also had 
to be made regarding who would be sent to represent 
American labor and American socialism and whether 
or not to send a Jewish representative. The choices 
of Root, Socialist Charles Edward Russell, and labor 
leader James Duncan were not well received in 
some quarters. Anti-war and pro-German forces 
attacked their credibility, usually unfairly, 
both in America and in Russia. The resulting 
damage may have ruined any chance of success that 
the Mission may have had prior to its departure 
from America. 
Although most members of the Root Mission were 
at worst harmless, the critical choices of Root, 
Russell, and perhaps Duncan were poor, even fatal, 
one. This was not due to any real failing on their 
part, but because of their inherent political vulner-
ability. After their arrival in Petrograd, the 
American emissaries met constantly with numerous 
members of the Provisional Goverru:tent, the old Tsarist 
government, and various other Russians, Americans and 
x 
Allied representatives. The Mission was hampered by 
President Wilson's excessive concern with war aims 
and peace terms which prevented it from addressing both 
of these crucial issues. Thus restrained, the members 
concentrated on information gathering and encouraging 
the Russians to fight. Several members had exciting 
adventures and at least three had profound short-term 
impacts. Only two members of the Mission visited the 
Soviet, which had become the visible center of power 
in Russia. This was most probably for obvious reasons 
of diplomacy. It is doubtful that either American had 
a profound impact on the Soviet. 
Despite their lack of Russian background the 
Mission's members had, by the time of their departure, 
a surprisingly comprehensive if somewhat narrow 
understanding of the Russian situation. They 
concluded very early that a massive publicity campaign 
was desperately needed, but the administration ignored 
their requests for money and other necessities to be-
gin it. In spite of the frustrations thus engendered 
the American emissaries returned in an openly opti-
mistic frame of mind. This positive outlook probably 
reflected the assumption that the predicted Bolshevik 
revolt would be crushed and that this occurance would 
bring an end to internal divisions in Russia. Further, 
xi 
an optimistic appraisal of the situation would have 
a positive effect on the American war effort. After 
they returned to America, most members of the Mis-
sion demonstrated a serious concern for Russia s fate. 
However, at an immediate audience with the President 
the emissaries' plans for a major propaganda campaign 
in Russia were not even mentioned by President Wilson. 
Several members continued in their attempts to see 
the President or otherwise to influence Russia and 
America. During the fall of 1917 a modified form of 
the proposed publicity campaign was finally begun. 
It was too little and too late. 
It is impossible to determine whether America 
could have influenced the course of events in the 
Russia of 1917. If she could have and failed, the 
blame, barring as yet undiscovered information, must 
lie with Woodrow Wilson. 
Purpose and Scope 
The purpose of this study is to examine the 
Root Mission to Russia from it conception to its 
final report and to evaluate the effectiveness of 
each member individually as well as that of the 
Mission as a whole. Further, major actions and 
responses of the Wilson Administration and other 
American officials have been considered where these 
xii 
actions have a direct bearing on the e£fectiveness of 
the Root Mission. This study·a1so provides a nar-
rative account of the constructive work of the commis-
sion and attempts to highlight those experiences which 
might well have had a significant impact on the Mis-
sion's understanding of the Russian situation. It is 
not the purpose of this study to provide a deftnjtive 
account of all aspects of the Root Mission, its 
members, or the Wilson Administration's relations with· 
Russia during this period. Nevertheless, this work 
does examine the majority of available sources relat-
ing to the Root Mission, its members, and the adminis-
tration during this period of American History. 
The scope of this paper is limited to the pre-
sentation of the actions, experiences, and viewpoints 
of the mission and its individual members both as to 
the Russian situation and to the actions of the 
administration. Naturally much of the correspondence 
between the President, Secretary of State Lansing, 
and other important Americans has been included. 
It is not within the scope of this :Paper to pro-
vide a definitive study of internal administration 
and State Department communications or to examine, in 
depth, the Russian reactions to the Root Mission or 
its members. All primary Russian sources contained 
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herein were those that were translated for Root 
Mission personnel and can be found in American 
sources. Most secondary Russian sources on this 
period have little bearing on the Mission but often 
provide interesting background information. Several 
important subtopics require further study that is be-
yond the scope of this paper. These include internal 
State Department communications, Russian newspaper 
reactiai to the Root Mission, and the activities of 
Charles R. Crane. Neither the primary nor secondary 
sources used in this study document or strongly sug-
gest any other conclusion than the one I have 
reached. It is important to note, however, that 
the motivation behind the inaction of Wilson, Lansing, 
and other important American officials on the issue 
of a major progaganda campaign remains in doubt and 
to my knowledge undocumentable. 
Sources 
The primary sources used in developing this 
study include the papers of Woodrow Wilson, Robert 
Lansing, Elihu Root, Charles Edward Russel, and 
General Hugh L. Scott, all of which are housed in 
the Library of Congress. With some important 
exceptions, I have used only those parts of the 
papers cited above that bear directly on the Root 
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Mission: March throuoh Auqust, 1917. The most use-
ful among these include The Report of the Root Hinsion 
and The Log of the Root Mission, both included in 
the papers of Elihu Root at the Library of Conqrcs,s, 
and several separate reports by General Scott (in tho 
Russell Papers), l\dmiral Glennon (Root Papers), and 
Dr. John R. Mott (Root Papers). In addition. State 
Department records, housed in the National Archives 
under the title, "World War I and itn Termination, 
1914-1929" were used extensively. This source con-
tains many of the documents that have not been pub-
lished in the extremely valuable scricn, Tho United 
States Department of State: Papers Relating to the 
Foreign Relations of the United Staten. Of this 
latter series, The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920, and 
1918: Russia, particularly Volu~n I contain much of the 
official correspondence between administration off 1-
cials and American diplo~~ts abro:id that bears 
directly on this period. ?:cvcrthclcss, there arc 
many important co:::.~unications that can only be 
found in the National Archives. In addition The New 
York Times has been used extensively throu9hout. 
Existing primary sources that were not consulted 
include: Dr. ,\rthur Link's r.i.ajor work on the W1laon 
papers: tho p.'lpcrs of O~vid R. Fronc1n. tho A.~crican 
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Ambassador to Russia during this period, located 
at the University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri; 
the papers of Colonel Edward M. House at Yale 
University; the papers of Colonel William V. Judson at 
the Newberry Library in Chicago; the papers of Samuel 
N. Harper at the University of Chicago; and papers 
·Of Charles R. Crane which are divided between the 
Institute of Current World Affairs in Hanover, New 
Hampshire and Columbia University in New York. I know 
of no other existing papers relating directly to the 
Root Mission, its members, or those closely connected 
with it. 
Dr. Link's work on the Wilson Papers, has not, 
as of December, 1979, been carried up to the period 
of the Mission. Judging from his written accounts, 
his communications with his superiors, and comments 
made about him by George Kennan, Jr. and Lincoln 
Steffens, the papers of David R. Francis would 
probably contain only insignificant insights on the 
Root Mission. The papers of Colonel House may con-
tain some useful information that cannot be found 
in Charles Seymour's The Intimate Papers of Colonel 
House and other primary and secondary sources. 
Colonel Judson's activities were largely centered 
around those,of General Scott and thus usually out-
side the activities of the main body of the Root 
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Mission. Nevertheless, they may be important sources 
on this topic and are certainly important from 
August, 1917 until Judson was recalled from Russia. 
Samuel R. Harper's memoirs were published posthumously 
and were used herein. The Crane papers at Columbia 
University may be examined only with permission of 
his closest living relative which I was unable to get 
at the time of this writing. Although most of these 
papers are not crucial, the absence of those of Crane, 
Harper, and possibly Judson prevent this from being 
a definitive study. 
Memoir accounts by those who were with the Mis-
sion, include two books by Charles Edward Russell, 
Bare Hand and Stone wa1·1s which covers most of his 
life and contains a chapter on his activities in 
Russia and Unchained Russia which gives his views 
on why the Allies 'failed to understand the situation 
and thus 11 save 11 Russia. The latter is excellent. 
Colonel T. Bentley Mott's Twenty Years as a Military 
Attache is a useful account that supports Root's 
viewpoint of the Mission. James Duncan recorded his 
experiences in a pamphlet entitled "Labor Presents 
Russian Revolution," which appears to have been a 
copy of the speech he delivered to the American 
Federation of Labor's convention in Buffalo in 1917. 
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The author found it useful but short of enlighten-
ing. 
Memoir accounts by American of official status 
during the period include Secretary of State Robert 
Lansing's War Memoirs which touches on the Root 
Mission, David R. Francis' two books, Russia from 
the American Embassy, a rambling account of limited 
value, and Russia Observed, demonstrates that Francis 
did eventually gain a better understanding of what 
had occured. Samuel N. Harpers memoirs, entitled 
The Russia I Believe In,· The Memoirs of Samuel N. 
Harper, 1902-1941, were useful for background infor-
mation and include his appraisal of the Root Mission, 
Francis, and the Russian situation. 
A most valuable memoir account is by one of the 
Russian guides, Dmitri Fedotoff-White, and is entitled 
survival Through War and Revolution in Russia. Taken 
in part from the author's diary, this work gives an 
excellent and thorough account of Admiral Glennon's 
activities. Fedotoff-White also offers characteriza-
tions of the Root Mission's members which add some 
insight, admittedly opinionated and one-sided, into 
their characters, habits, and appearances. The diary 
of American Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, 
and his book, The Wilson Era, offer background on 
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decision making at the cabinet level during this 
era and describe the March 23 meeting that dis-
cussed the Root Mission. Alexander Kerensky, who 
led the Provisional Government after May 15, 1917 
wrote numerous books giving insight into his view-
point and a minimum of information on the Root 
Mission. His major book covering this era is 
The Catastrophe.: Kerensky's own Story of the Russi·an 
Revolution. Influential industrialist Charles R. 
Flint's Memories of an Active Life gives support 
to Root's viewpoint that the American Mission was 
a "grandstand play" perhaps designed to discredit 
Root. Famous "muckraker" Lincoln Steffen's Autobio-
graphy sheds some light on Charles Crane. George 
Creel's How We Advertised America and Rebel at Large: 
Recollections of Fifty Crowded Years discuss American 
war propaganda but give little on the Root Mission. 
Arthur Bullard, who was eventually given charge of 
American propaganda in Russia, barely touches on the 
Root Mission in The Russian Pendulum: Autocr:acy -
Democracy - Bolshevism. Samuel Gompers Seventy Years 
of Life and Labor reveals his viewpoints on various 
topics including Russia and the revolutions. Morris 
Hillquit's highly opinionated Loose Leaves from a 
Busy L'ife mentions Root I Russell and others. 
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My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic 
Memories, a two volume work by.Sir George Buchannan, 
British Ambassador at the time fails to touch on the 
American Mission but gives interesting background 
on the numerous personalities of the era. American 
Ambassador to Sweden Ira Morris offers some insights 
on American policy towards Russia in From and American 
Legation. 
Secondary sources on particular individuals who 
were members of the Root Mission include Philip c. 
Jessup's excellent biography,· Elihu· Root, Albert 
Parry's brief but useful account of Charles R. 
Crane's life in the Russian Review, Basil Mathews 
biography of Dt. Mott, entitled John R. Mott: World 
Citizen, and Justin Kaplan's' Lincoln Steffen's: A 
Biography. 
There are as yet no secondary sources dealing 
with the Root Mission either exclusively or in detail. 
George F. Kennan, Jr.'s Russia Leaves the War was 
very useful on the period and gives background infor-
mation on several members of the Root Mission. The 
most useful general sources of the period included 
William Henry Chamberlain's The Russian Revolution, 
1917 - 1921, Marcel Lievman's The Russian Revolution, 
Robert D. Watth's The Allies and the Russian 
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Revolution and William Appleman Williams' American-
Russian Relations, 1781 - 1941~ Max M. Laserson's 
Tbe l\merican Impact on Russia: Diplomatic and 
Idealogical, 1784 - 1917 contained background infor-
mation and a critical view of the President's choices. 
Christopher Lasch's American Liberals and The Russian 
Revolution was also insightful and somewhat critical. 
The most useful views of Woodrow Wilson's 
political background and general approach to Foreign 
Policy were Harley Notter's The Origins of the Foreign 
Policy of Woodrow Wilson, Arthur s. Link's Wilson the 
Diplomatist and N. Gordon Levin's Woodrow Wilson and 
World Politics. 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE TWO GOVERNMENTS OF RUSSIA 
-1-
On March 15, 1917, Tsar Nicholas II of Russia 
relinquished his throne, ending three hundred years 
of Romanov rule. Nicholas was a victim of several 
, 
factors, most importantly his own naivete and inep-
titude and the Russian governmental system. He 
headed an autocracy which had proven itself to be 
incapable of handling the social and political 
problems of a society that had begun to move into 
the modern, industrial world after 1880. When World 
War I broke out, Russia's bureaucratic inefficiency 
and industrial backwardness were no match for Kaiser 
Wilhelm's highly organized war machine. As the war 
progressed, the government found itself faced with 
food shortages that it could not rectify and mount-
ing internal dissention. In addition, the Tsarina, 
her advisor--the infamous Gregory Rasputin, and a 
group of high court officials were widely rumored 
to hold pro-German sympathies. The combination of 
high court rumors, military defeats, and internal 
chaos caused one important member of the Russian 
legislature to question, in December, 1916, whether 
Russia's defeats were the result of "stupidity or 
1 treason." 
Despite these rumblings from below, most Russians, 
from Monarchists to Bolsheviks, were surprised by 
the Revolution of March, 1917. The revolt that was 
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to topple the Romanov dynasty had begun as a bread 
riot on March 9. By the early morning hours of March 
13; these riots had grown into a full scale revolt 
that forced the Czar to abdicate on March 15. 2 
Following a brief attempt to preserve the mon-
archy, first under the Tsar'~ son, Alexei, then under 
the Czar's brother, Grand Duke Michael, power in 
Russia fell to two groups: The Temporary Committee of 
the Duma and the Petrograd Soviet. The Temporary Com-
mittee of the Duma had been created on March 11, 1917, 
after the Tsar, buoyed by an exaggerated report of 
that day's successful suppression of demonstrating 
crowds, dismissed the Duma. 3 After technically accept-
ing the Ts;=ir'c:: 11k;=ic::,,. +h~ members of the major non-
Rightest Duma parties formed a Temporary Executive 
Committee with monarchist Duma President Michael 
Rodzianko as its leader. The avowed purpose of the 
Temporary Committee was to preserve order in the 
capital, b11t many of its mP.mbers also retained the 
hope of preserving the Monarch in some form. In fact 
the rapid pace of events caused some members of the 
Committee to argue that they should take power before 
the more radical elements seized it. 4 Eventually 
this viewpoint won out and on March 16 the Temporary 
Committee created, from among its members, the 
Provision Government of Russia. 
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Politically the Provisional Government cannot 
be said to have reflected the Russia of 1917. Al-
though it represented the major moderate parties 
in proportion to their representation in the old 
Duma, that body had been elected in 1912 under an 
electoral system deliberately designed to favor 
conservative parties. As a result the large and 
powerful socialist parties had only one representa-
tive: the charismatic Labor Duma deputy, Alexander 
Kerensky. Along with Kerensky, the new Government 
consisted of seven Cadets (Constitution Democrats) 
and five Octobrists (Conservative Nationalists), 
giving it a political stance that would have been 
moderately liberal before the Revolution but was 
now decidedly conservative, particularly on issues 
relating to the war and economics. 5 
The principal figure in the new government was 
Dr. Paul N. Milyukov, a classical Liberal whose model 
government was the British Parliament. Historian 
William H. Chamberlain describes Milyukov, who was 
the leader of the Cadet Party, as shre\old but some-
what academic. 6 Titular leadership of the Provisional 
Government rested in the hands of the public-spirited 
but colorless President of the Union of Zemstvos and 
Municipalities, Prince George E. Lvov. Other ministers 
worthy of note were Finance Minister Michael I. 
-4~ 
Tereschenko, a wealthy, young sugar manufacturer from 
the Ukraine and War Minister Alexander I. Guchkov, a 
'Well-to-do Moscow merchant and leader of the Octobrist 
7 party. 
Counterpoised against the Provisional Government 
was the Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers 
Deputies. This body traced its origins to the 
Revolution of 1905 and was initially a somewhat 
accidental group composed of socialist Duma represen-
tatives, radical lawyers, and journalists. The 
Soviet met for the first time since 1905 on March 16 
in a room of the Tauride Palace. Originally known 
as the Soviet of Workers Deputies, it was expanded 
to include representatives of the large number of 
soldiers who had gathered in the ·room. During 
March and April of 1917 the predominance of power in 
the Soviet was held by the Menshevik wing of the 
Social Democratic Party and the largely agrarian 
Social Revolutionary Party. ~he Bolshevik wing of 
the Social Democratic Party remained in eclipse 
until the return of Lenin in April. But even 
after Lenin's return the more moderate parties re-
mained in control until mid-September. 8 
On March 14 Dr. Milyukov reached an agreement 
with the Soviet on a general program for ruling 
Russia. By the terms of this agreement the Provisional 
-5-
Government was to act as caretaker until a Con-
stituent Assembly could be elected. Agreement was 
also reached on the establishment of various 
democratic institutions and such measures as a 
general amnesty, the right to organize and to 
strike, and freedoms of speech and press. 9 
It was on the critical issues of continuing 
the war, the type of peace that would follow, and 
Socialist desires for redistribution of land that 
the bourgeois Milyukov and the leaders of the 
Soviet were unable to agree. These critical issues 
were to continue to be the cause of sporadic inter-
nal unrest throughout the Provisional Government's 
existence. In addition to creating problems for 
the government, the failure to adequately resolve 
these questions served both as weapons in the hands 
of the Bolsheviks and thus ultimately political 
difficulties for the moderate socialist parties 
which did not attempt to force a final resolution 
f 1 d t . 10 o the an ques ion. 
The Petrograd Soviet, initially owning the 
allegiance of the majority of soldiers and workers 
in the capital, might well have resolved both issues 
and taken power for itself in March. That it did 
not was due primarily to the philosophy of its 
majority, which felt that the Revolution was bourgeois 
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in character and that Russia must first go through 
a period of capitalist rule and' development before 
socialist theories could be applied. This philos-
ophy was so pervasive among the majority of Soviet 
members that even the ideas of sharing power with 
the government or allowing individual members of 
the Soviet to participate in the government were 
initially voted down by that body's Executive 
Cornrnittee. 11 But despite the Soviet's decision not 
to participate in the Provisional Government it was 
able to exercise considerable de facto veto power 
due to its extensive following. 12 
The resulting dual system of government pre-
sented a confusing picture to most Russians and to 
their Allies. Realistically~ the ability of any 
group to exercise power depended upon support of 
the leaderless soldiers in general and those of the 
Petrograd garrison in particular. The soldiers, 
having largely rejected their officers but having 
no leadership structure of their own, were clearly 
unprepared to take power. Nevertheless, their 
identification with and support of the Soviet put 
the Provisional Government in a precarious position 
whenever it disagreed with the former body. 13 
In the United States President Woodrow Wilson 
had officially learned of the March Revolution on 
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on March 14 when the American Ambassador in Petrograd, 
David R. Francis, had cabled Secretary of State 
Robert Lansing. Francis reported that he had been 
unable to send a telegram since March 11 and that 
the "Revolutionists have absolute control in 
Petrograd and are (making) strenuous efforts to 
preserve order, which successful except in rare 
instances. 1114 
Like most other Americans, Wilson's background 
on Russia and her affairs must be presumed to have 
been extremely limited. There is no evidence that 
he had studied the affairs of that nation at any 
time. The vast majority of the President's back-
ground and experience inclined towards domestic 
rather than foreign affairs. In the latter he 
assumed that the primary goal of American diplomacy 
was to translate American ideals into action in the 
world. He idealistically desired a peaceful world 
but felt this would only occur when "democracy" 
15 triumphed everywhere. Professor Arthur Link 
summed up the President's problems with foreign 
policy: 
Time and again Wilson used the same 
methods and almost always with the same 
results: the formation of faulty 
policy\through sheer ignorance, men 
working at cross purposes, confusion 
in the state Depart~ent and in the. 16 
embassies and legations, and the like. 
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It is little wonder that Wilson told a friend shortly 
before assuming office in 1913 that it ''would be the 
irony of fate if my administration had to deal chiefly 
with foreign affairs. 1117 Nevertheless, Wilson, by 1917, 
did have experience in foreign affairs: what he lacked 
was knowledge of Russia. Unfortunately his Secretary 
of State knew little more about Russia than did the 
President. 
Secretary of State Robert Lansing had followed 
his father into the practice of law and had first 
turned towards diplomacy in the 1890's when he married 
the daughter of President Cleveland's Secretary of 
State, John Foster. Thereafter, Lansing served as an 
American representative in numerous international 
arbitrations until 1916 when he became counsellor of 
the State Department. When William Jennings Bryan 
resigned in 1915, Lansing was chosen as his successor. 
Like Wilson s,Lansing s background reveals no particu-
lar knowledge of or interest in Russia. Despite this 
fact he was to exert considerable influence on the 
makeup of the American commission and on Wilson's view 
of the American and Russian roles in World War r. 18 
On March 20 Robert Lansing had put forward the 
idea that the Russian Revolution was important to the 
Allied cause because it had ''removed the one objection 
to affirming that the European War was a war between 
-9-
Democracy and Absolutism." Lansing felt that such 
an approach would "put a new spirit in the Allies" 
and might strengthen both the Russian democracy and 
the democratic element in Germany. 19 Although he 
did not accept this view initially, by April 2, in 
his War Message to Congress, Wilson made several 
references to Russia, describing her as "always in 
fact democratic at heart" and having "added to our 
hope for the future peace of the world" by throwing 
off the "terrible" autocracy which ruled her. Wilson 
referred to Russia as "a fit partner for a league of 
honour. 1120 With the United States now fully conunitted 
to the War, Russia's new democratic government and 
its ability to continue became matters of great con-
cern to the administration. Lacking adequate 
knowledge, the President relied on various sources 
but turned principally to a set of trusted advisors. 
This small group consisted,on this issu~ of Lansing, 
Colonel Edward M. House, Charles R. Crane, and 
21 Professor Samuel N. Harper. 
Colonel House had long been one of the President's 
key advisors and trouble shooters. Like Lansing he 
had no extensive personal knowledge of Russia, but 
he did have numerous sources of information, mostly 
British and French, who at least as early as January 
1916, had become concerned about Russia's ability to 
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continue the War. Although House's influence on 
Russian affairs appears to have been limited after 
the first stages of American relations with the 
Provisional Government, he did influence America's 
1 t th t . R . 22 ear y responses o e new governmen in ussia. 
Charles Crane was the son of a wealthy Chicago 
industrialist who had amassed a great fortune in 
the plumbing business. Originally a Republican, 
the younger Crane had become active in the Progressive 
Party. In 1912 he had decided to support Wilson over 
Roosevelt and had been active in financing Wilson's 
campaign. Crane's long-standing romantic interest 
in Russia resulted from his extensive travel there 
and his many contacts among Russia's upper and middle 
classes. Crane was primarily interested in Russian 
art and religious affairs, but Wilson seemed to have 
placed great and perhaps undue reliance on Crane's 
h . 1. t. 1 . t t. 23 view of t e Russian po i ica si ua ion. 
Samuel Northrup Harper first became interested 
in Russia when his father, William Rainey Harper, 
then President of the University of Chicago, had 
joined Charles Crane on one of his many visits to that 
country. Harper had converted his early interest in 
Russia into a career, becoming Professor of Russian 
Language and Institutions at the University of Chicago 
with his chair being financed by Crane. Harper, who 
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had visited Russia many times, had attended four 
sessions of the Duma and had witnessed the Bloody 
Sunday massacre of 1905. 24 He had gone to Russia 
twice during the war, once in 1915 as advisor to 
Ambassador Francis and again in 1916 on his own. 
Harper's contacts in Russia, unlike Crane's, were 
primarily among bourgeois circles, although he had 
also made limited contacts with some socialist groups. 25 
Upon learning of the Russian Revolution on March 
14 Lansing asked his aide Richard T. Crane, who was 
Charles Crane's son, to contact Professor Harper in 
order to obtain "some knowledge of the participants 
in the revolution and the purpose sought by it. 1126 
Harper's analysis of the situation was both simplistic 
and to a large extent inaccurate being based on very 
little knowledge of what had actually occurred. 
Harper informed the State Department that the March 
Revolution was political rather than social in nature. 
The revolution had not been directed against the 
dynasty but was a revolt against attempts by the Czar's 
government to "disrupt public organizations" such as 
the Prince Lvov's Zemstv~ Union, the War Industries 
Committees, and the peasant cooperative societies. 
Further it was clear to Harper that the Duma had the 
support of these public organizations and the Army. 
Based on this belief he concluded that the leader of 
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the Provisional Government would "be able to hold 
the confidence of (the) country and army" and 
accomplish its aim, namely a "more effective prose-
cution of war and war till victory. 1127 This view 
completely ignored the fact that the leaderless 
soldiers and workers of Petrograd, who had brought 
about the March Revolution, were certainly not motiva-
ted by a desire to win the war. 
Charles Crane's initial analysis of the state of 
affairs in Russia was remarkably similar and Wilson 
appears to have accepted the Crane-Harper view that 
the Provisional Government had "the confidence of 
the Russian people" and that the "liberal-nationalists" 
who, from Harper's viewpoint, appeared to be in 
control were enthusiastic supporters of demoncracy 
based on the Western model. 28 
The initial reaction of the American public was 
also one of enthusiasm and optimism. Particularly 
indicative of this trend were the mass meetings held 
in New York under the sponsorship of such groups as 
the American Society of Friends of Russian Freedom, 
the American Conunission of the All-Russian Zemsky 
Union, and the American Committe for the Encouragement 
. R . 29 
of Democratic Government in uss1a. 
The enthusiasm of the administration and important 
sections of American society was initially confirmed 
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by America's diplomats in Russia. America's 
Ambassador to Russia at this time was David R. 
Francis. Francis was not well suited for the task 
he was to face. He had initially been sent to 
Petrograd in March of 1916 to negotiate a new trade 
treaty with Russia. 30 A former Mayor of St. Louis, 
Governor of Missouri, and member of President 
Cleveland's cabinet; Francis was undoubtedly selected 
to negotiate the new treaty because of his loyalty 
to the Democratic Party and his background as a grain 
merchant and banker. As a diplomat, however, he 
was a poor choice. He neither had familiarity with 
Russia nor spoke the language. His midwestern man-
ners soon made him a virtual outcast at the court of 
the Tsars. Even one of his admirers described him 
as "a very blunt, outspoken American, who believed 
in speaking his mind regardless of the rules of 
diplomacy. 1131 
In spite of his personal drawbacks, Francis' 
prestige and influence as the representative of the 
world's foremost democracy soared with the coming of 
the March Revolution. On March 18 he cabled Lansing 
asking that he be allowed to be the first Ambassador 
to extend recognition to the new government, which 
"will have a stupendous moral effect especially if 
given first. 1132 Lansing replied in the affirmative 
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on March 20, in spite of Colonel House's attempts to 
have the United States await recognition by Britain 
33 
and France. On March 22, 1917, at 4:30 pm, Francis 
formally recognized the Provisional Government on 
behalf of the United States at a meeting of the Council 
f M .. t 34 o inis ers. 
Outside of Francis, the Wilson Adminsitration's 
major sources of information were the American consuls. 
at Petrograd and Moscow; North Winship and Madden 
Summers. The contrast between their reports and those 
of Francis is striking. Francis reports were often 
overly optimistic and almost always lacking in depth. 
While the Ambassador appears to have been well informed 
on the feelings and opinions of the Provisional Govern-
rnent he had very little knowledge or understanding of 
the Soviet and seems not to have even bothered to 
send an observer to that body. 35 Winship and Surruners 
on the other hand were well informed on the Russian 
situation and wrote excellent, lengthy reports. 
Unfortunately, Francis' short telegrams arrived in 
Washington one or two days after they were sent. The 
reports of Winship and Summers were sent by diplomatic 
pouch and took from one to two months to reach the 
State Denartment. 36 
Francis' first reports had emphasized the virtu-
ally universal acceptance and tranquil aftermath of 
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the March Revolution. 37 By March 23 he had, however, 
become concerned, warning Lansing that the "social-
istic element composed of working men and soldiers 
holding continuous meetings in the Duma are advocating 
abolition of classes and the right of soldiers to 
disobey their officers. 38 In spite of this situation, 
Francis was able to report that Petrograd remained 
tranquil and that the Provisional Government was grow-
ing stronger, although it was "compelled to handle 
socialistic element carefully and danger from that 
source is not entirely dissipated. 1139 
This potential threat from the Russian left did 
not dissipate; by April 11 Francis was warning that 
conditions in the Russian armed forces were "precarious", 
that certain groups were "urging peace", and that some 
of his sources of information feared that the "army 
will be influenced thereby." Lansing, undoubtedly 
already concerned about German pressure on the eastern 
front, passed the cable to the President, adding that 
he wished "we could do something to prevent the social-
istic element in Russia from carrying out any plans 
which would destroy the efficiency of the Allied Powers." 
The Secretary of State went on to suggest that the 
United Stat.es send a "commission of some sort" in 
order to accomplish this purpose. 40 This marks the 
beginning of the official discussion between the 
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President and Secretary Lansing on this subject. 
More importantly Francis' cable and Lansings' response 
document the Administration's awareness of the possi-
ble threat to the continuation of the war effort that 
was posed by the Russian socialists. 
CHAPTER TWO 
A CONSERVATIVE MISSION 
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It was on the basis of Ambassador Francis 
telegrams and several other coricerned sources that 
the idea for an American mission to Russia was first 
conceived. In his response to Lansing's memo of 
April 11, Wilson stated that the "suggestion of a 
commission to Russia has come to me from a number of 
quarters, and I am inclined to think that it would 
be a good plan to send one, and send it .practically 
at once. 111 When and by whom the idea of sending a 
commission to aid the Provisional Government first 
came is not certain. It is certain, however, that 
the idea did not originate with Wilson, and it appears 
to have come from several sources over a period of 
about a week. 
The earliest documentable mention of sending 
some type of American commission to Russia appears 
to have occurred on April 7 when the New York Times 
mentioned that a group of unidentified Americans 
"having large interests in Russia" sent a report to 
London which recommended an American commission of 
"national character" to help in providing for finan-
cial assistance and various other supplies that the 
new government in Russia might require. Further, such 
a commission "would do much to cement the stability of 
the institutions which have resulted from the revolu-
tion. 112 
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On April 9, Oscar Straus, the former chairman 
of the Federal Trade Commission, presented such a 
plan to Andrew D. White. White, a former American 
Ambassador to Russia, apparently conveyed Straus' 
ideas to Robert Lansing and Colonel House. Straus 
discussed the matter with his close friend George 
Kennan who reports that both Lansing and House liked 
Straus' idea, provided the Provisional Government was 
amenable. 3 
On April 10 Colonel House cabled Wilson from New 
York that "some distinguished Frenchmen asked me today 
to suggest to you the sending of an American Commission 
to Russia. 114 
Charles R. Flint, a merchant, shipper, financier, 
and adventurer, who frequently corresponded with the 
President, wrote Wilson in April urging that a com-
mission, "thoroughly representative of all elements 
in American life", be sent to Russia to experess the 
"congratulations and sympathy of the American people 
and "to ascertain the most effective means by which the 
two countries could cooperate in the prosecution of 
the war. 115 
Whether Wilson received similar suggestions in 
other personal corrununications is not revealed by the 
sources available. It does appear that those who 
were offering advice to the President were concerned 
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about both the possibility that Russia would be un-
able to continue the war and their own economic 
interests. 6 With America now having joined the 
conflict, Russia's ability to pin down a sizeable 
portion of the eastern armies of the central powers 
became of paramount importance to Colonel House and 
his French acquaintances. The latter went so far 
as to propose that American aid for the Provisional 
Government be preconditioned on a continuation of 
the war. Russia must "be told authoritatively that 
if they are to have the good will and financial 
support of this country, they must compose their 
internal differences and not make a separate peace 
at this time. 117 
Undoubtedly the purposes that were to be ful-
filled by sending a mission to Russia were clear in 
the minds of Wilson's advisors. However, it is 
critical to any analysis of the success or failure 
of the Root Mission that Wilson's own concept of the 
purpose of the mission and his instructions to its 
members be known. If the President shared the view 
of his advisors that the purpose of the Mission was 
to keep Russia in the War then his selection of 
personnel, his final instructions to them, and their 
performance must be judged on that basis. If the 
President had other purposes in mind then these ques-
tions should be approached accordingly. 
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Unfortunately the President's public and private 
statements on this subject consist of rather innocuous 
generalities. On May 17 the United States conveyed 
its official statement of purpose to the Provisional 
Gevernment. The American Mission was being sent to 
convey 11 the friendship and good will" of the United 
States, to express the "confident hope" of America 
that the new democracy of Russia "will join with the 
free people of America in resisting with firmness 
and fortitute the ambitious designs of the German 
Government", and to find "the most efficient means 
of cooperating with the Russian Government in the 
prosecution of the war. 11 8 Thus it is clear that 
the Administration wanted to keep Russia in the war 
and that this goal was at least one of the objects of 
the Mission. 
The President, in the invitations extended to 
the American envoys, asked them to show Russia 11 our 
interest and sympathy at this critical juncture in 
Russian affairs and to associate ourselves in counsel 
and in all friendly service with the present Govern-
ment of Russia. 119 Additional statements reflect a 
similar view of the Mission's purpose and for perhaps 
understandable reasons Wilson seems to have avoided 
any public reference to the war-oriented objective of 
th . . 10 e Mission. 
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In the absence of any record of the actual 
instructions that were given verbally to the members 
of the Mission, the clearest statement of the aims 
of the Root Mission was, due to its confidential 
nature and sources involved, a cable from a member 
of the Root Mission, Basil Miles, to Moscow Consul 
Madden Summers. This cable was sent on June 18, 1917, 
with the purpose of informing Summers of the Mission's 
arrival in Moscow and its aims while in Russia. Miles 
stated that: 
This is a war mission, whose purpose is 
concerned exclusively with what the United 
States can do to help Russia prosecute the 
war immediately to a successful conclusion. 
The mission,. if practic~ble (sic) is anxious 
to impress on the public mind the firm and 
vigorous support offered by the United States 
to free Russia.11 
The speeches and actions of the Mission's members 
while in Russia reflect this view. 12 
On April 14 Lansing, at the instructions of 
Wilson, cabled Ambassador Francis· asking him to 
"Discreetly ascertain from Milyukov 11 whether it would 
be acceptable for the United States to send a commis-
sion of "distinguished Americans to consult with the 
Russian Government as to the best means of cooperation 
and to convey a message of good will from the United 
States. 1113 On April 19 Francis responded that such a 
mission was acceptable. He suggested that it "should 
-22-
be very discreet and 9ivc attention first and r.uiinly 
to successful prosecution of the war, cxcrcisino 
care in giving expression to views concernino in-
ternal affairs." 14 
The process of selectin9 personnel for tho Mis-
sion was nevertheless bc9un even before tho Provisional 
Gover~~ent had approved the idea. The Prooidcnt wrote 
Lansing on April 12 with his initial list of persons 
to serve on the co:r::tission, followino the suooestions 
Colonel House r..ade to him on April 10: "a prominent 
Jew (Oscar Straus), a businessl'!\<ln (W1llard Straioht), 
a labor leader (Sar:lucl Go~pers), and ar. c-ducator 
(Benjamin Ide Wheeler)." To thenc he added Charles 
R. Crane and Samuel Harpcr. 15 
LansinQ, whose suggestions cvcntunlly represented 
a r.~jority of the co:-:-::iiss1on, dincarded rnont of the 
Wilson-House suggestions in rcnpondinq to the Presi-
dent later in the aay. Reta1n1nq Gor.:pcrs and Crane, 
Lansing found that Wheeler and Stra19ht were unsuit-
aolc, that Oscar Straus r.liqht overplay .. tho Jew 
clcr:icnt" if G~pcrs W'cre also chosen and that Harper, 
according to "several dlf fercnt sources 18 not as 
popular as I had supposed in Rusa1a," and should not 
be sent. Lansinq went on to propose Doctor John R. 
?-!ot t, "a bus 1ness~.an 1 ikc Cyrus :-tcCon:iick or Harold 
(Howard) Elliott: a f 1nanc1cr 11kc Bertrand (Samual 
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Bertron); and a lawyer of prominence. 1116 Of these 
all except Howard Elliot made the trip to Russia. 
Although the President relied to a large extent 
on Lansing to initiate the individual selections, he 
did have a clear idea of the type of men he wanted. 
To Wilson the "important, perhaps the all-important 
thing is the personnel. Men of large view, tested 
discretion, and a sympathetic appreciation of just 
what it is they have been sent over for are the sort 
we need;" further, " ••• they should look the part." 
In addition Wilson clearly wanted a bipartisan mission: 
" ••• they must not all be Democrats - need not any of 
them be Democrats, - but should all be genuinely enthu-
siastic for the success of the Russian revolution. 1117 
Crane, Dr. Mott, Bertron, and McCormick appear to have 
fit this description; in Wilson's view their inclusion 
in the Mission appears to have been setted from April 
19 onwards. 18 
It is obvious from the type of men chosen that 
one of the major functions of the first tier of com-
missioners was to represent various American interests, 
e.g., labor, finance, business, religion. These men 
were given the title Envoy Extrordinare and were 
largely selected for their knowledge and standing in 
their fields of endeavor. They were expected to be 
able to confer on these broad topics with their 
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Russian counterparts. Only Crane and to a lesser 
degree Dr. Mott and Cyrus McCormick had prior inter-
ests in Russia. It was undoubtedly a major purpose 
of the second tier of the commission to provide the 
knowledge that their superiors often lacked. 
Dr. John R. Mott was an American leader of the 
Y.M.C.A. Although he was a Methodist, he became 
fascinated by the Russian Orthodox Church. He was 
active in attempting to bridge the gaps between all 
Christian churches but had taken a particular interest 
in the Russian Church, perhaps because of its geographic 
isolation from the majority of Christian groups. Dr. 
George M. Day, Fraternal Secretary of the Y.M.C.A., 
described Mott's attitude as "extremely agile •.• in 
hurdling the barriers of denominationalism, creed, 
color, race! To him the words of our Lord, 'that they 
all may be one', were sacred, prophetic, vital!" Dr. 
Mott had made contacts with the leaders of the Russian 
Church and had visited Russia in 1909. He was a 
natural and appropriate choice to join the American 
M. . 19 l.SSl.Oil. 
There is little information available on Samuel 
Reading Bertron. Born in Mississippi, Bertron had 
graduated from Yale and thereafter founded the banking 
firm of Bertron and Storrs in New York. Although it 
does not appear that he had any connection with or 
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knowledge of Russia, he did have some prior diplo~ 
matic experience having been an American representative 
to the Turkish-Italian peace negotiations of 1912. I 
have found no written record of his business or polit-
ical dealings or of his activities while a member of 
the Root Mission. 20 
Cyrus R. McCormick was the son of the famous 
inventor of the reaper and head of the International 
Harvester Company, which had relatively extensive 
business interests in Russia and was part of the 
massive holdings of J. P. Morgan and Company. 
McCormick had frequently corresponded with the 
President on subjects relating to Russia during the 
spring of 1917. 21 
While the choices of Crane, Dr. Mott, Bertron, 
and McCormick were handled with dispatch the remaining 
selections required greater consideration. Choosing 
the right man to lead the American Mission appears 
to have caused much discussion and involved the entire 
cabinet. This was, of course, a critical choice, most 
probably because diplomatic missions of ten take on 
the character of their titular head, especially in the 
minds of the press and general public of both their 
own nation and the nation to which they are sent. 
The field of candidates being considered for the 
leadership position was narrow. The President had 
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initially wanted to send a member of his cabinet, 
and Colonel House thought Treasury Secretary William 
G. McAdoo would be the best choice. Secretary of 
Interior Frank K. Lane was also mentioned. 22 Wilson 
decided, however, that members of his cabinet could 
not be spared from the more pressing problem of war 
t . 23 prepara ion. It was thus decided to look outside 
the administration for a man to head the commission. 
The President and his cabinet appear to have con-
sidered only three possibilities: Wilson's own former 
Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan: former 
President Theodore Roosevelt, and former Secretary 
of State Elihu Root. 24 
William Jennings Bryan had long been a pacifist 
and was a vigorous opponent of American entry into 
World War I. He had, in fact, resigned as Wilson's 
Secretary of State when the President insisted on a 
firm note to Germany which Bryan believed might 
h 1 d t . t. 25 close t e ast oor to nego ia ions. Nevertheless, 
with America's entry in the conflict, Byran had offered 
his services and declared that the "discussion has 
ended," the entire country must now "stand undivided 
behind the President." The proof of his sincerity 
can be seen in the fact that he was to spend much of the 
war supporting bond drives and giving patriotic 
't 26 speeches to new recrui s. Bryan also had some 
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previous connections with Russia, having visited that 
country in 1902. If Secretary of the Navy Josephus P. 
Daniels' account is correct, Bryan had once predicted 
that Russia would be the "first country in Europe to 
become a Republic. 1127 There is no documentary evidence 
that President Wilson had any reason not to select his 
former Secretary of State. Bryan's resignation had 
apparently been of a cordial nature and both men 
appear to have been saddened by the occasion. 28 
William Jennings Bryan would have been a good, 
even excellent, choice to head the American commission 
precisely because he had been such an adamant and 
vociferous pacifist prior to April, 1917. Further, 
his liberal-populist viewpoint and gift for fiery 
oratory may well have appealed to many Russian social-
ists and possibly some of those who opposed the war. 
Of the three candidates for the position he was the 
least vulnerable to socialist criticism. 
Former President Roosevelt was another poten-
tially good, perhaps excellent, choice. Although 
Roosevelt did not have an extensive knowledge of 
Russia, he had been the mediator of the Treaty of 
Portsmouth ending the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. 
This must have given him some standing in that country 
which, when added to the fact that he was a former 
American President, makes it highly likely that he 
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would have been recognized in Russia as a name, a 
personality, and perhaps a friend. The choice of 
Roosevelt seems a good one because the former Presi-
dent 1 s fairly progressive views and record were 
widely known and difficult to tamper with. While 
not quantifiable, Roosevelt also possessed a certain 
charisma that could well have made him extremely 
popular with the Russian people and an inspirational 
war advocate. He had a domestic following similar 
in size to Bryan's and there appears to have been some 
popular support for the idea of sending him to Russia. 29 
Further, Roosevelt appears to have been the only one 
to have actually expressed an interest in the appoint-
ment. John Hays Hammond, an American mining engineer 
and associate of President Taft, stated in his auto-
biography that several of the ~ormer president's 
friends had asked him to intercede in Roosevelt's be-
half. Hammond approached Colonel House, who liked 
the suggestion of sending the flamboyant Republican 
to Russia. 30 Wilson, however, did not. He dismissed 
the idea with the remark that "I could not in any 
circumstances consider the suggestion of sending Mr. 
Roosevelt anywhere to represent the administration." 
Thus President Wilson's longstanding distaste for 
Roosevelt prevented the latter's selection. 31 
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Senator Elihu Root's background made him an 
obvious choice from the standpoint of enlisting 
Republican support for the Administration's war 
program; a policy that Colonel House had strongly 
urged the President to follow. 32 
Born in Clinton, New York, in 1845, Root had 
begun his law career by starting his own firm in 
New York City, where he soon became a leading 
corporate lawyer. During the last two decades of 
the nineteenth century he had become interested in 
politics and had associated himself with the reform 
element of the Republican Party of New York. He 
subsequently became a close friend of Theodore 
Roosevelt. In 1899 President William McKinley, look-
ing for a man with legal skills to administer the 
territories recently acquired in the Spanish-American 
War, appointed Root to the post of Secretary of War 
In this position Root successfully dealt with the 
Philippine insurrection in 1900 and effected a major 
reorganization of the War Department. With.the death 
of John M. Hay in 1905 Roosevelt appointed Root 
Secretary of State. Between 1905 and his resignation 
from that office in 1909 Root brought about signifi-
cant improvement in American relations with both Latin 
America and Japan, concluded the lengthy North Atlantic 
fisheries dispute, and negotiated numerous arbitration 
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treaties with Europe. In 1912 he recei~ed the Nobel 
Peace Prize for his handling of American possessions 
as Secretary of War and ·his successes as Secretary of 
State. Upon his resignation from the State Depart-
ment in 1909 Root won a seat in the United States 
Senate from his native New York. He remained in the 
Senate until 1915, where he aligned with the Taft 
Republicans and became a leading and vociferous 
opponent of President Wilson. 33 Root's opposition 
to Wilson was in fact so vociferous that the President 
had on one occasion described Root and Massachusetts 
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge as men who would stoop to 
"twist the truth", had little conscience and used 
"insincere and contemptible methods of fighting. 1134 
After America declared war on April 6 the suggestion 
came from various quarters that a war-time coalition 
cabinet be formed and that it include both Root and 
Roosevelt. It is doubtful that the President looked 
on this idea with any degree of enthusiasm. In any 
event it was Root who took the President off the hool 
by declaring on April 9 that the Republicans needed 
"no coalition Government to make us loyal. We will 
make a coalition ourselves with every Democrat in the 
35 
country." 
It was Lansing who first mentioned Root for this 
position at a cabinet meeting in April. Secretary of the 
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Navy Josephus Daniels, who appears to have raised 
the only objection, wrote later that he considered 
Root deserving of the appointment in every way, but 
feared that the former Secretary of State would be 
perceived as "a little brother of the rich" and that 
the Russian refugees then living in America would be 
able to discredit Root in the eyes of Russian social-
ists. "Before Root arrives in Russia these reports, 
unjust to him, will close the ears of Russian revo-
lutionists to his arguments and appeals. He will 
not have a chance to do the things he sincerely 
wishes to do." Daniels contends that he actually 
made this specific statement at the time and was not 
using the advantage of hindsight to criticize or 
apologize for Wilson's selection. If his memory was 
accurate, Daniels' reservations should have been 
heeded, for they demonstrated remarkable foresight. 36 
Daniels states that he went on to suggest that 
either former President Roosevelt or William Jennings 
Bryan be appointed to head the Mission. Both Lansing 
and McAdoo were unbending in their support of Root. 
The President, who had earlier expressed his determina-
tion not to let considerations of party enter into the 
h . d McAdoo. 37 0 A ·1 19 debate, sided wit Lansing an n pri 
the President wrote Lansing that if the Secretary 
found Root to be "a real friend of the Revolution" 
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during his conference with the Senator ~n that date, 
then Root should head the cominission. 38 Root 
apparently met Wilson's qualification, for on April 
21 the. New York Times reported that the former Sen-
ator "appeared tonight to be the probable selection, 
although several other men were under consideration. 1139 
According to Lansing, Root accepted on April 24 at a 
dinner given by the Secretary of State for visiting 
British leader Arthur Balfour. 40 Root called on the 
President on April 26 to accept the job formally and 
discuss the situation. 41 The following day his 
appointment was publically announced by the State 
Department. 42 
Numerous reasons have been suggested for the 
selection of Root to head the commission. Clearly 
the impetus came from Lansing. Josephus Daniels 
suggests that perhaps it was because Root had sup-
ported the appointment of Lansing as Counsellor to 
h t ~ 't' 1 . t 43 t e State Depar ment a~ a cr1 1ca JUnc ure. 
Certainly Lansing had cause to be grateful as he 
probably would not have become Secretary of State 
had he failed to obtain the Counsellor post. It 
is more probable however that Lansing, in addition 
to his own conservative inclinations and appreciation 
for Root's support, felt that the former Secretary 
of State was the best choice from the standpoint of 
diplomatic expertise. 
-33-
Why Wilson was willing to support Lansing on 
this is of course the crucial· question. Colonel T. 
Bently Mott, who accompanied Root on the Mission, 
suggests that Root was chosen in order to satisfy 
the cries for a proposed coalition cabinet44 This 
seems unlikely, for the coalition issue had already 
been settled. It is cleac however, that Wilson was 
concerned with Republican support in the House of 
Representatives and in the country as a whole. This 
partisan concern must be considered a secondary fac-
tor in Root's selection. 45 
Charles R. Flint, who visited Root just prior 
to the latter's departure suggests that Root was 
sent "for the purpose of weakening his political 
prestige. 1146 Although Root's participation in the 
Mission may have had this effect there is no evidence 
that Wilson had intended such a result. 
Wilson himself, in response to critics of the 
appointment, emphasized Root's experience, understand-
ing of the fine art of diplomacy, and sympathy for 
the new Russian democracy. 47 This latter consideration 
was of paramount importance to the President. It 
probably stemmed from the genuine sympathy which 
Wilson himself felt towards that nation. 48 It also 
shows that Wilson was serious in his hopes that the 
Mission would at least be helpful to the new Russian 
Government. 49 
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Another requirement that the President empha~ 
sized was that the members of the Mission "must look 
the part. 1150 This requirement appears to add credence 
to the theory that Wilson was at least secondarily 
concerned that the Mission give a prestigious appear-
ance to both America and the Provisional Government, 
a purpose for which Root was well suited. 
The selection of the man who was to lead the 
mission was made with dispatch, even haste. The 
elections of representatives of American socialism 
and American labor, and the decision not to send a 
Jewish representative were made with greater diffi-
culty. Wilson and Lansing had clearly decided that 
a representative of labor should be included and had 
agreed on Samuel Gompers, President of the American 
Federation of Labor, on April 12. 51 The suggestion 
had come originally from Colonel House in his cable-
gram of April 10, but he had changed his mind by 
April 20 after learning that Gompers was "persona 
non grata with the labor people" in Russia. 52 Wilson 
had apparently already come to this conclusion by 
the nineteenth, feeling that "Gompers himself and the 
leaders irrunediately associated with him are known to 
be pronounced opponents of Socialism and would hardly 
be influential in the present ruling circles of labour 
at Petroqrad." Wilson suggested someone named 
-35-
"Lehman", but added that Lansing should consult with 
Gompers as to who would be a ,;real representative of 
American Labour"; not a socialist but yet someone who 
would not be regarded in Petrograd as "an active 
opponent of Socialism".s 3 
Gompers recommended James Duncan the first Vice 
President of the American Federation of Labor and 
sixty year old head of the Granite Cutters Inter-
national. Born in Scotland, Duncan's primary accom-
plishment was his successful leadership of a campaign 
to bring the eight hour day to the granite cutting 
industry. Duncan had no formal diplomatic experience 
aside from participation in several international 
trade union conventions, and there is no evidence 
that he had any knowledge of Russia or the sentiments 
of her workers.s 4 He accepted an invitation to join 
the mission on May 7, stating that he was "in hearty 
accord" with the Mission's objectives.SS Duncan was 
not a good choice and the reason for his selection, 
in spite of Gomper's recommendation, is uncertain. 
The President may well have selected Duncan because 
he felt that sending a representative of the American 
Federation of Labor was a domestic political neces-
sity. Nevertheless Wilson knew that Gompers and his 
"inner circle", which must have included Duncan, 
were not acceptable to many, if not most, Russian 
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. l" t 56 SOCJ.a J.S S. The effect of this selection was to 
place all hope of establishing a rapport with the 
Soviets in the hands of an as yet unnamed American 
socialist. 
The idea of sending a second representative 
from the American Socialist or labor camps was prob-
ably conceived on April 19 when Joseph Choate, an 
American diplomat and lawyer, saw Lansing and men-
tioned that knowledgeable friends of his in New York 
"thought that two representatives of labor should be 
sent" to Russia, "one from each class." Lansing 
passed the idea along to Wilson, saying that he pre-
sumed Choate's advisors to have meant that represen-
tatives of both socialist and non-socialist labor 
. 1 h ld b t t R · 57 circ es s ou e sen o ussia. The President 
agreed and the difficult search for an American 
socialist who would be acceptable to Russian social-
ists and who had views on the war that were acceptable 
to the administration began. 
The choice was a difficult one because the 
Socialist Party of America was, in 1917, dominated by 
such pro-German and anti-war socialists as former 
Wisconsin Congressman Victor Berger and Morris 
Hillquit. For some unknown reason, perhaps naivete, 
Berger was actually asked to join the mission but 
declined. When Hillquit's name was mentioned, 
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Wisconsin Senator Paul o. Hustings recommended 
that Wilson publicly deny that such "rabid pro-
Germans11 were even being considered. 58 
The field was quickly narrowed to those Social-
ists who had declared their willingness to support 
the war effort. The names most often mentioned were 
William English Walling, Arthur Bullard, A. M. 
Simons, John Spargo, George Kennan and Charles 
Edward Russell. 
Walling was the nephew of Grover Cleveland's 
Vice Presidential candidate in 1880. He spoke fluent 
Russian, was a contributing editor of numerous popu-
lar magazines, and a founder of the NAACP. Walling 
was perhaps the best choice for the position and 
quickly became the Administratd.on's first choice 
after being suggested to Root by Charles R. Flint. 59 
After daily meetings with the Secretary of Labor, 
Walling declined State Department Counselor Frank 
Polk's invitation to join the American commission; 
despite his willingness to serve he feared that the 
anti-war socialists would attempt to discredit him. 60 
Walling went on to suggest Simons, Spargo, or Russell, 
in that order. Simons, the non-Jewish head of the 
Milwaukee Branch of the Wisconsin Defense League, 
declined. 61 John Spargo apparently was passed over, 
and attention now turned to Charles E. Russell. 
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Russell had been a reporter and writer with several 
major American newspapers and was the author of 
twelve books and numerous.articles of an anti-
capitalist, anti-corruption bent. In 1908 he had 
become active in the Socialist Party and was their 
candidate for Governor of New York in that year and 
again in 1912. In March of 1917 he had joined several 
other prominent American socialists in writing an 
article for The New Republic in support of the war. 62 
In addition Russell had written Wilson that he was 
convinced that the United States should intervene 
in the war in an attempt to rid the world of German 
autocracy and militarism permanently. 63 
Despite this ietter to the President the choice 
of Russell came from Lansing, who wrote the President 
on May 3 that he had read w. E. Walling's The Social-
ists and the War and found the views of Charles 
Russell contained therein to have been "more in 
accord with what I conceive to be the best suited 
• • 1 • t II 64 to influence Russian Socia is s. Russell was 
invited soon thereafter. .Like Duncan he had neither 
diplomatic expertise nor familiarity with Russia and 
was apparently selected largely on the basis of his 
views on the war. Since the Russian Socialists were 
unlikely to pay much attention to an American trade 
union representative the selection of an American 
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socialist who could both support the war and relate 
well to the Russian socialist~ was again critical. 
Although it was difficult to find such a represen-
tative, either Arthur Bullard or George Kennan 
might have been better choices. 
Bullard's background in Russian affairs was 
extensive. He knew many members of the Russian 
socialist parties and had been active during the 
Revolution of 1905. In addition he met the necessary 
criteria of supporting the war and being an active 
socialist although he was not a member of the social-
ist party of America. Bullard had been recommended 
by Simons on May 4 when the latter declined to join 
the mission, but the President did not pursue Simon's 
suggestion at that time. 65 Bullard was again recom-
mended to the President by George Creel on May 14. 
Creel, newly appointed head of the Corrunittee on 
Public Information, had met with the President in 
early May to discuss this very topic but had over-
looked Bullard on that occasion. On May 14, after 
Russell had already been invited, Creel wrote Wilson 
about Bullard. Wilson thought that the suggestion 
was "a splendid one" and said that he had just sent 
66 Lansing a note to that effect. Lansing, either 
resenting the influence of Creel or finding Bullard 
too liberal, blocked his appointment on the grounds 
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that Stanley Washburn, a London Times correspondent, 
had already been selected for the position in 
question. 67 
George Kennan would have been another excellent 
choice to represent the American socialist viewpoint 
to the Russian people. Kennan was a noted author, 
lecturer, and world traveller and had spent many 
years in Russia in various pursuits. There Kennan 
had become well versed in Russian affairs and his 
expose of Tsarist practices in the Siberian prison 
system made him popular in Russian socialist circles. 68 
On May 3 Senator Root wrote Lansing supporting Kennan's 
inclusion in the trip to Russia in some capacity. 69 
Why Kennan wasn't invited is unknown, although he may 
have been ill at the time.70 In any event neither 
Bullard nor Kennan became members of the Root Mission, 
and Russell, totally unknown in Russia, became 
America's best hope of reaching the Russian masses. 
The question of whether to send a Jew as a member 
of the commission became both a difficult and embarras-
sing issue. It was Colonel House who had originally 
suggested that a prominent Jew be includea. 71 
Lansing, while not opposing the inclusion of a Jewish 
representative, had not wanted to send more than one, 
72 
and he preferred Gompers. When Gompers declined 
Wilson decided to send Eugene Meyer of New York. 
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Meyer was a Wall Street banker and close friend of 
Justice Louis D. Brandeis. He had no diplomatic 
experience and no apparent connection with Russia; 
his selection was probably due entirely to his 
friendship with Brandeis. Meyer accepted the invi-
tation and began preparations for the trip. On 
April 30 Lansing, following a conversation with 
Stanley Washburn, told the President that it would 
be a "great mistake" to send any Jews to Russia 
because "there was never a more intense bitterness 
and hostility to the race than at present." Washburn 
apparently felt that this was due to the Provisional 
Government's "endeavoring to impress the idea of 
liberalism in the treatment of the Jews." Further-
more, the presence of a Jew on the commission would 
arouse "popular suspicion" as to the purpose of the 
Mission and thereby threaten its effectiveness. 73 
Ambassador Francis telegraphed a similar opinion. 74 
The issue may have been decided on May 2 when 
Colonel House added fuel to the fire by warning 
Wilson that the commission already contained too 
many capitalists and that there was strong opposition 
to Meyer who was seen by some as a "reactionary 
stockbroker of doubtful reputation" and whose only 
qualification was his friendship with Brandeis. 75 
With such ~rrenuous opposition corning from both 
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Russia and America, the administration was forced 
to withdraw the Meyer invitation. On the negative 
side Lansing warned that it would be difficult to 
explain this in America and it would require "very 
careful handling. 1176 On May 3 Meyer, accompanied 
by Brandeis, visited Lansing and declared his willing-
ness to withdraw upon learning of the administration's 
't' 77 posi ion. 
The fact that Meyer had been asked to withdraw 
from the Root Mission did not make news in the United 
States until late May, when Judge Aaron Levy of New 
York, who had met with Wilson on several occasions, 
published a story in the New York Hebrew-language 
daily, The Warheit. He recounted the incident and 
claimed that Meyer had been dropped because the 
Provisional Government "objected to having a Jew on" 
th C . . 78 e ornrnission. The President, who had been trying 
to keep the matter out of the press both for its 
possible negative effect on the Provisional Govern-
ment and for obvious domestic political reasons, was 
"shocked" and "amazed" that his confidence had been 
violated. A series of cables between Levy, the 
President's secretary, Joseph P. Tumulty, and Wilson 
followed. Levy protested his innocence and contended 
that the rival Jewish paper, The Day, had intention-
ally misinterpreted him in its telegram to Tumulty. 79 
,-- -------------
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The Meyer and Levy incidents did not become American 
political issues and were ha~dly reported, but 
President Wilson remained convinced that his confi-
dence had been violated. 80 The Warheit 1 s article 
may well have adversely influenced American Jewish 
opinion of the Provisional Government. 
Although the labor and Jewish questions were 
perhaps the most difficult, the remaining selections 
were not easily made. On May 7 the acting chairman 
of the American Red Cross wrote Wilson suggesting 
that a member of that institution should be included 
in the Mission as it would "enhance our reputation 
and show you care. 1181 Assistant Secretary of State 
William Phillips inquired as to what Root thought 
of the idea. For some reason the former Senator 
responded that he was "absolutely and unalterably 
opposed" to this. 82 Wilson sided with Root, perhaps 
out of deference to the Special Ambassador, and the 
matter was dropped. There is no evidence to explain 
Root's vehemence on the subject. 83 
Aside from the Red Cross, numerous other insti-
tutions and individuals applied for positions. 
Wilson, Lansing, Root, and other influential govern-
ment officials were bombarded with requests to accom-
pany the Mission. In addition various Conunission 
members, particularly Cyrus McCormick, had their own 
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ideas of who ought to be included and numerous news-
papers asked to attach correspondents.a 4 
By mid-May the Root Mission was complete. In 
addition to Root, Crane, McCormick, John R. Mott, 
Bertron, Duncan and Russell, the other senior members 
of the Mission were General Hugh Scott and Rear 
Admiral James Glennon. The inclusion of military repre-
sentatives was suggested by Treasury Secretary McAdoo.as 
General Hugh L. Scott had made his reputation 
fighting Indians in the American West and as Governor 
of the savage Moro tribes of the Philippines. He had 
just retired his position as Chief of Staff of the 
Army and the Root Mission appointment was probably 
intended as his "last hurrah." In addition the 
appointment of the retiring Army Chief of Staff was 
undoubtedly considered prestigious from a diplomatic 
. t f . a6 poin o view. 
Rear Admiral James F. Glennon was the selection 
of Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels.a? The 
Admiral, who was younger and of lower rank than 
General Scott, was selected with an eye towards 
avoiding potential conflicts between two officers of 
equal rank. 88 At the time of his appointment Glennon 
was the Commandant of the Washington Navy Yard and 
Superintendant of its Naval Gun Factory; he was one 
of the Navy's foremost ordinance experts. His war 
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experience had included action at Newchwang, Santiago, 
Havana, and in the Philippines. Both Scott and 
Glennon were rather gruff, old-school types, who 
undoubtedly knew both their specialties and how to 
lead men. 
The middle level members of the Root Mission had 
much more experience in and knowledge of Russia. 
Rather than representing various groupings of 
American society, these men were undoubtedly selected 
with an eye towards providing insights and information 
about that country which most of their superiors 
lacked. First among these was the Military Attache 
of the Root Mission, Colonel William V. Judson. 
Judson was knowledgeable in Russian affairs, having 
been the U. S. Army's observer in Russia during the 
Russo-Japanese War. He was a graduate of West Point, 
had earned an M. A. from Harvard, and had served the 
Army in various capacities relating to harbor engi-
neering. George Frost Kennan describes Judson as "a 
man of utmost integrity of character" and credits 
him with much insight. 89 Judson's appointment to 
the Root Mission was the recommendation of Postmaster 
G 1 B 1 . 90 enera Omar ur 1son. 
Colonel T. Bentley Mott also had West Point and 
career military backgrounds. Mott had been to Russia 
in 1905 during the Russo-Japanese War but had only 
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limited experience in or knowledge of that country. 
Born in Leesburg, Virginia, he had spent the majority 
of his life in the Army serving in various capacities 
as an attache and observer. In 1903 he had assisted 
then Secretary of State Root during the Alaska Bound-
ary negotiations. He had become a close friend of 
Root's at that time and passed up an opportunity to 
join General Pershing's staff in order to go to 
Russia at Root's personal request. 91 
Major Stanley Washburn, who had spent the pre-
vious three years in Russia as a war correspondent, 
was made Secretary to the Mission. Lansing was very 
desirous that Washburn have this position and although 
the Major was ill at the time, he was persuaded to 
join the American party. Little has been written 
about Washburn. He was, however, one of the few 
members of the Mission who had an extensive Russian 
background and appears to have been both useful and 
influential. 92 
Mr. Basil Miles became Secretary of the Mission 
on May 9. Miles also had Russian experience having 
been Secretary to American Ambassador George Meyer 
in St. Petersburg from 1905 through 1907. During 
1916 and early 1917 Miles had been a special minister 
of the United States in charge of overseeing Russian 
t t t f G d A t . . f 93 rea men o erman an us rian prisoners o war. 
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Mr. Eugene Prince was named as a civilian aide 
and interpreter. Prince, who had been born and 
educated in Russia, provided both a knowledge of the 
language and the country. He was the Russian repre-
sentative of the Willys-Overland Company and owed 
his American citizenship to an act of Congress. Prince 
would join the mission in Vladivostok. 94 
Probably the most difficult task, according to 
Colonel Mott, was that of organizing the clerical 
staff. Numerous Congressional clerks, often with 
the backing of their employers, attempted to find a 
place with the Commission. 95 Two were selected: 
James F. O'Rourke, secretary to Senator Pomerane, 
and Jay Keegan, Secretary to Representative Baker. 
James F. McKenny, a State Department clerk, was made 
Chief Clerk and Disbursing Officer, and Duane E. 
Washburn, another clerk with a State Department 
background, served as a secretary. The remainder 
of the staff included McCormick's private secretary, 
Clyde s. Stilwell, General Scott's orderly, Seargent 
Paul z. Randolph, a clerk with the Carnegie Peace 
Foundation, George D. Gregory and George E. Long, who 
had been to Russia three times, as messenger. 96 
The overall make-up of the Root Mission was 
decidedly conservative, particularly considering that 
it was being sent to a country in which extremely 
idealistic socialists wielded much influence. 
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Root, Bertron and McCormick were all clearly connected 
with capitalism. Even the mor~ liberal members were 
relatively conservative by Russian standards. The 
progressive Crane was also a capitalist by birth, 
Russell was one of the more conservative socialists 
available, and Duncan's practical trade-unionism was 
totally out of place in revolutionary Russia. The 
documentary evidence available shows that the Root 
Mission was primarily the creation of Secretary of 
State Robert Lansing. Why Lansing maneuvered for such 
conservative personnel cannot be fully understood. 
Certainly his basic conservatism must be taken into 
account. Lansing's ignorance of the fundamental 
philosophies and relative strengths of Russian social 
and political groups must again be considered a fac-
tor. The Secretary of State may have simply picked 
people that he liked personally without a critical 
examination of the situation. 
Why Wilson took a back seat to-Lansing in the 
selection of the Mission's personnel is an even more 
interesting question, to which there appears to be 
no clear-cut answer. There is no apparent reason for 
the President to have assumed that Lansing had a 
superior understanding of Russia. It is possible, 
however, that Wilson had delegated this responsibility 
to his Secretary of State with the understanding that 
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the "experts" in this area, including Crane and 
Harper, and undoubtedly others, were to be consulted. 97 
In any event the Root Mission's final make-up 
was one that might well have been excellent for a 
mission coming to the United States. As a mission 
being sent to revolutionary Russia it was too con-
servative as a whole and, more importantly, its 
"liberal" members were exceedingly vulnerable to 
attack. Clearly neither the President not his 
advisors gave adequate consideration to the possible 
socialist reaction. It was, however, the reaction 
of the Russian refugees then living in America that 
may well have done most to destroy the Mission's 
credibility. 
CHAPTER THREE 
A TREASONABLE CONSPIRACY 
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The announcement of the appointments of the 
various members of the Root Mission was generally well 
received in America. The New York Times of April 26, 
1917, described the upcoming Root Mission as "one of 
the most important diplomatic missions which the 
United States has ever undertaken in foreign lands," 
and praised the appointment of Ambassador Root as 
"like putting the best diplomatic brains which this 
country can provide against the machinations of 
German diplomacy. 111 
Although the majority of American press opinion 
seems to have been favorable to the Mission and to the 
appointment of Root, there was opposition. It came 
from three broad groups -- those who were genuinely 
concerned that Root and perhaps other members of the 
Mission would not be well received, those who were 
not politically disposed to like Root, and those who 
were trying to prevent the Mission's success. 
Alexander Petrunkevitch, Yale economics professor 
and son of the first floor leader of the Russian Duma, 
was the premier public spokesman of the first group. 
Petrunkevitch first brougltup the issue at the 
Economics Club in New York where he cautioned that 
the members of the Root Mission will "be met there 
(in Russia) with distrust" because the New York 
socialist press opposed the Administration's choices 
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and would not hesitate to cable their condemnation 
of Root Mission personnel. Petrunkevitch went on 
to contend that the members of the Commission should 
be chosen with an eye towards accommodating the 
Social Democrats and Social Revolutionaries, whom 
Petrunkevitch considered to be, "now in power." The 
Yale professor further stated that he had attempted 
to convey his view to President Wilson but implied 
that the latter had been too busy with other prob-
2 lems. Petrunkevitch's speech is important because 
Senator Root, who declined to comment for some reason, 
read the reports of it, and President Wilson must 
have been aware of it. 3 Despite this warning, Wilson 
refused to reconsider, most probably because it would 
have been a public political embarrassment. 
Samuel Untemeyer, a prominent Jewish intellectual 
who appears to have been genuinely concerned for the 
ultimate success of the Mission, criticized Root's 
appointment on the grounds that he was "incredibly 
narrow and provincial in his conception of the Jew. 114 
Rabbi Stephen s. Wise of New York wrote the President 
on April 24 that he felt that Root should not be 
chosen, for he "represented those very influences and 
powers from which the Russian people have at last 
been liberated. 115 The views of Untemeyer and Wise 
were nndnubtedly motivated in part by the domestic 
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political concerns of the American Jewish community. 
It is not at all clear that Root's attitude toward 
the Jews, whatever it may have been, had any signifi-
cant impact upon his reception in Russia. 6 
While some of the criticism that was leveled at 
Root came from those who were either genuinely con-
cerned with the Mission's success or merely offended 
by Root's appointment, the majority of the attacks on 
the former Secretary of State came from sources bent 
on discrediting Root and the Mission altogether. 
Abraham Shiplacoff, a socialist member of the New York 
Assembly, went so far as to present a resolution ask-
ing the President to reconsider the appointment. Root 
was very popular in New York, even amongst Democrats, 
and Shiplacoff's resolution was quickly "hooted down" 
by his fellows and a motion was "unroariously carried" 
to the effect that no mention of it be made in the 
. 1 7 JOUrna • 
Representative Meyer London (D-New York) made 
the critical observation that the Russian socialists 
would look on the appointment of Root "as a calamity. 118 
This attack may well have been strictly political in 
nature; it was not well received. London was even-
tually forced to publicly deny that he was leading a 
movement to discredit the commission. 9 
Morris Hillquit, one of the most important leaders 
of the majority, anti-war faction of the Socialist 
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Party of America, was very critical of Root's appoint-
ment and warned that "There is no doubt • • • that by 
the time Mr.Root reaches Petrograd the people of 
Russia will be informed of his record as a conserva-
tive. 11 When asked if he had conveyed this message to 
Russia, Hillquit replied "Not yet," but "I repeat they 
will know all about Mr. Root. I can assure you of 
that." A reporter mentioned that Hillquit's veiled 
threats might, if carried out, constitute a violation 
of a law against discrediting government representa-
tives during time of war. The socialist leader con-
tended that the Root Mission was not a war mission 
only a friendly "visit. 1110 
Hillquit's threats began a series of attacks on 
Root and other members of the Commission by the anti-
war, often pro-German, socialists. Various socialist-
oriented newspapeis including Victor Berger s 
Milwaukee Leader, the New Yorker Volksreitung, a 
German Social Democratic paper, the radical socialist 
New York Call and the Russian Social Democratic paper, 
Novy Mir, attacked Root for his conservatism and his 
alleged mistreatment of two Russian refugees; 
Christian Rudewitz and Janoff Pouren. The Volksreitung 
went so far as to call Root the "fiercest enemy of 
comrades Rudewitz and Pouren. 1111 
The charges concerning Pouren and Rudewitz were 
baseless and in fact the direct opposite of the truth. 
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Both men had fled Russia under fear of imprisonment. 
Under intense pressure from the Tsarist regime the 
United States government had ordered them, through 
the court system, returned to Russia. Root, then 
Secretary of State, had intervened in their behalf 
and ordered the cases reopened. Extradition orders 
were denied in both cases. 12 Despite these facts 
the socialist papers must have had some effect, for 
some of the thousands of refugees who were returning 
to Russia from America undoubtedly believed them. 
Although it is impossible to document, it is cer-
tainly probable that some pro-German and anti-war 
socialists sent letters and copies of their newspapers 
to Russia hoping to discredit Root. 13 
Somewhat surprisingly, one of the major allies of 
these socialist papers was Progressive Republican 
Senator Robert M. LaFollette of Wisconsin. LaFollette, 
while perhaps a socialist at heart and certainly 
extremely anti-war in oratory, was· presumably not 
pro-German in sentiment. Nevertheless, it was 
LaFollette who gave greatest credence to the notion 
that Root had attempted to deny political asylum to 
Pouren and Rudewitz. LaFollette made these charges on 
the Senate floor on April 27, 1917. 14 Whether he had 
gotten his "facts" from the pro-German socialists or 
vice-versa is unknown but his mention of Root's 
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treatment of Russian refugees occurred prior to those 
of the socialist papers. More importantly LaFollette's 
position made the charge more convincing to those 
Russians and Americans who wished to believe them. 15 
As titular head of the American Mission, Ambas-
sador Root was likely to receive some criticism. He 
was not alone; James Duncan and Charles Edward Russell 
were also targets. The most damaging of these attacks 
occurred in Russia, where Maxim Gorky's The New Life 
expressed "astonishment" at the choices of Duncan and 
Russell and claimed that neither was an official rep-
resentative of either American labor or socialism. 16 
Obviously James Duncan was as true a representative 
of American labor as could have been sent and Samuel 
Gompers wasted no time in cabling Petrograd to that 
effect. 17 Russell had no defense. On May 15 the 
National Executive Committee of the Socialist Party 
of America, easily dominated by pro-Germans, issued 
a statement asking Russell to decline his appointment, 
denied that Russell truely represented American 
socialism, and expelled their one-time candidate for 
18 Governor of New York. 
While Wilson, Root, Duncan, and Russell offered 
no public defense, the Administration's friends did 
counter-attack through W. E. Walling and Samuel Gompers. 
Wallina attacked the Hillquitt group on May third, when 
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he accused them of a pro-German attitude and of 
aiding the enemy. Remarkably, Walling suggested 
that there should be no socialist representative 
whatsoever, while at the same time he stressed the 
need to conciliate the Soviet. 19 In another state-
ment issued the same date, Walling and J. G. Phelps 
Stokes, another important socialist in the Walling-
Russell camp, recommended another of their group, 
James W. Gerard, as a popular choice to represent 
Am . . l' 20 er1can soc1a ism. The reason behind these contra-
dietary statements is unknown. On May 5 Gompers, at 
the request of Senator Root, cabled the Petrograd 
Soviet that the "Kaiser's agents in New York as well 
as in Russia" were carrying on "a campaign of mis-
representation and villification" against the Root 
Mission and were not to be believed. 21 
On Monday, May 7, the Department of Justice 
revoked the passport of Boris Reinstein, "a prominent 
member of the Socialist Labor faction in New York", 
stating that it was feared that Reinstein intended to 
go to Russia to agitate against Root and the American 
M . . 22 1ss1on. Reinstein was closely connected with the 
anti-war faction of Berger and Hillquit; whether he 
had intended the actions he was accused of is unknown. 
On May 20 the New York Times struck what was 
apparently the final blow in the battle between the 
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administration, its allies, and tho anti-war and pro-
Gcrman socialists. In an editorial of that dato, 
entitled A Treasonable ConRpiracy, the JJrncs stated 
that Gompers ought not to be forced to fight "sinQlo 
handed" .Jgainst the "orc;;nni:cd and trcononoblo o!!ort 
now being made to undermine the A.~cr1can Co~ission 
to Russia." The TimcR defended Hoot, Runncll, "n 
socialist who puts !"~er ica f irnt". :ind Duncan and 
accused their opponents of Qiving "aid and co::lfort 
to the encmy." 23 It will in all prob.3b1l1ty never 
be known whether this veiled threat would hovo been 
carried out, but its effect wan to n1lcnce tho Root 
Mission's critics. 
Despite the e!fect of the Ti~cn' ed1torinl it 
is possible, even probable, that the da~~Qc to Root, 
Russell, and possibly Duncan had nlrcady been dono. 
The choices were questionable in the !1rst place and 
their vulnerability should have been anticipated. It 
should be said in the defense of the Kilson Ad~inis-
tration that it was !aced v1th a dt!!icult dtlc::r.~. 
The adr:anistration could not send pac1f tstti or r:-~jority 
factlon socialists 11ke 13.crqcr and H1 llqu1t to con-
vince Runsia to rc~a1n in the war. On the other h<>nd, 
~en 11kc Root. Dur.can and Russell vcre cantly d1n-
crcditcd in Russiar. eyes. The ad~1n1ntratton'a best 
course would perhaps have been to ncnd ~en like Bryan, 
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Roosevelt, Kennan, and Bullard, who both favored the 
prosecution of the war and were more likely to be 
highly esteemed in Russia. The selection of a social-
ist was certainly a major problem, and on the surface 
it would be difficult to quarrel with the Party's 
candiaate for Governor of New York as a proper repre-
sentative of American socialism. Unfortunately, 
among the activist ranks of American socialism, 
identification with ethnic background outweighed 
both their loyalty to the country that had taken them 
in and the neutralist and anti-autocratic tenets of 
their political philosophy. 
Despite domestic opposition, whether well in-
tended or not, it is highly questionable whether the 
initia 1 ignorance and overly optimistic outlook of 
the Root Mission's members could have been overcome. 
The necessarily pro-war position of the American 
representatives could never have been well received 
in some important circles in Russia. Even Bryan, 
Roosevelt, Bullard, and Kennan would have been forced 
to take this pro-war position. Whether they would 
have been more convincing is open to question. They 
would, however, have presented greater problems for 
Russia's anti-war factions. 
Despite this domestic opposition the final compo-
sition of the Root Mission was set by early May, 
,----
1 
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although Root's initially positive outlook on the 
expedition had changed. First, his cordial relations 
with Wilson and Lansing were interrupted by the an-
nouncement that a second American mission was being 
sent to Russia. This was the Commission of Railway 
experts, headed by the famous American engineer, 
John F. Stevens, and being sent to assist Russia with 
her severe transportation problems. The idea of send-
ing railway experts to Russia had originated prior 
to the March Revolution. 24 After the Revolution the 
two missions were at first to be merged but the 
administration decided to separate them. 25 Root 
was opposed to separate missions and cabled Lansing 
that it was "plain ·that we can't have three bodies 
dealing with the Russian Government at the same time 
-- the regular Embassy, the President's Mission and 
the R. R. Commission." Root suggested that the Rail-
b . 1 d d . h. M. . 26 way experts e inc u e in is own ission. 
Lansing forwarded Root's views to the President who 
considered the problem to be one of misunderstanding. 27 
Wilson's view was that the. two commissions should be 
separated because of their functional difference. 
Basically the Root Mission was to gather information, 
while the Railroad Commission was to examine the 
transportation crisis on a first hand basis and aid 
the Russians directly and specifically. The division 
-60-
was a natural one and the President expected Root 
to understand the reasons for it once he had been 
able to consult with Bertron, with whom Wilson had 
discussed the matter. 28 
Although Ambassador Root had perhaps over-
reacted to the appointment of a separate Railroad 
Commission, he also began to have serious doubts 
about the real purpose of the mission; perhaps with 
good reason. 29 A few days prior to Root's departure 
he was visited by William English Walling, Melville 
Stone, head of the Associated Press, and Charles R. 
Flint, the wealthy and highly influential financier. 
Flint recorded the meeting. Root remarked that he 
was "going to Russia in the same spirit that my 
(Flint's) son is enlisting in the Army" but Flint 
felt that Root was "fearful that the corrunission • • • 
was not likely to be properly supported." 30 There 
is no other evidence that Root actually said this and 
Flint's recollections were published after the fact 
in 1923. Nevertheless, Root had obviously been con-
cerned when he asked Flint and Walling to go to 
Washington and persuade Gompers to cable the Petrograd 
Soviet in support of the Root Mission. In his memoirs 
Flint suggested that Root was sent to Russia "for the 
purpose of weakening his political prestige. 1131 
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The best evidence against this view is Wilson's state-
ments to Lansing as to the caliber and personnel he 
desired for the Commission made on April 12, 1917. 32 
Further Root, at age 72 and having retired from the 
Senate, was no longer a direct political threat to 
Wilson. Although Root was still a very influential 
man and it is certainly possible that, while never 
stated, the political objectives of the President 
and his Secretary of State were either assumed or 
conveyed orally, Flint's conclusions are highly im-
probable. 
Whatever the case may have been, Ambassador Root 
appears to have been concerned both with the support 
the Mission was to get from the Wilson Administration 
and the reaction of the Russian socialists. If Flint' 
report of his conversation with Root is accurate it 
may show that Root was at least suspicious of the 
optimistic reports on Russia's internal situation that 
he had been getting from some quarters and suspected 
that the soviet was a body of potentially significant 
political clout and worthy of some observation. 
Certainly we know that Root had read the report of 
Petrunkevitch's speech and we can probably assume 
that he read the various reports relating to the 
activities and statements of the Soviet carried in 
the New York Times during April and May of 1917. 33 
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Further, Root had received cables from, among others, 
Melville Stone (on May 15) to the effect that the 
Russian socialists did not look on him favorably. 
Stone had gotten this view from Charles H. Boynton, 
an associate of Eugene Meyer and member of the 
American-Russian Chamber of Commerce, who had gone 
to Russia on March 19 to promote Russian-American 
trade. 34 The Ambassador received a similar report 
from Count Leo Tolstoi, who had earlier backed 
Roosevelt, and who now predicted some trouble for 
Root in Russia. 35 
It would be surprising if the attacks on Root 
in the press and the warnings from Boynton and Tolstoi 
didn't raise some serious doubts in the former 
Senator's mind. Still, when he wrote his wife that 
he was not looking forward to the trip and that he 
was going to be "awfully bored" in Petrograd, he made 
no mention of the anti-war socialists• attacks or his 
questions about the behavior of the President. 36 In 
addition to his doubts about what awaited him, he was 
probably not in the best of health as he had just 
recovered from 11 a severe attack of the grippe. 1137 
The Ambassador had come to look on the Mission as a 
tedious duty. He ordered a large package of novels 
and two cases of Scotch. 38 
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The Root Mission left Pennsylvania station in 
Washington at 6:15 pm on May 15 in two pullman cars 
belonging to the Pennsylvania Railroad. On the six-
teenth the Conunission stopped near Chicago to allow 
Professor Harper to board. Harper was to brief the 
Root Mission on the political situation in Russia. 39 
After changing trains in Chicago the party proceeded 
to St. Paul and Seattle. It was during this unevent-
ful trip of three days that Harper briefed the Mission 
on his appraisal of the Russian situation. Whether 
his views had changed significantly from the ones he 
had originally cabled to the State Department is 
unknown but highly probable. On May 18 Root cabled 
Lansing asking that Charles Crane, who had now been 
in Russia for several weeks, cable his impressions to 
Vladivastok for the Mission's inspection. 40 The 
remainder of the trip was spent being entertained by 
General Scott who recounted his adventures among the 
Indians. 41 
On May 20 the Root party arrived in Seattle 
and were met by Captain Hinds of the USS Buffalo; a 
reconverted destroyer which was to take them to Russia. 
Cyrus McCormick, who had been on the West Coast for 
personal reasons, joined the Mission that afternoon 
after which they departed. The first few days were 
cold and unpleasant and several members of the Mission 
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fell victim to seasickness of which General Scott's 
was the most serious case. From May 25 to the 30th 
the Buffalo was engulfed in a dense fog with visi-
bility limited to a few hundred yards. The passengers 
occupied themselves with "deck golf, an invention of 
Dr. Mott, Colonel Mott's sand-filled football, and 
movies. On May 30 the Buffalo entered the Sea of 
Okhotsk where the first bird alighted. As the dense 
fog cleared on the thirty-first the Buffalo was forced 
to change course when it hit an iceberg. Damage was 
minimal. As the Buffalo entered the Sea of Japan on 
June 1 the envoys began preparation for their mission. 
Senator Root addressed the group on the purpose of 
the Mission and warned against talking too freely "as 
Russia was full of German sympathizers and spies". 
Dr. Holton Curl instructed the party on the proper 
diet. 42 
On June 3 the Root Mission arrived in Vladivostok 
one day early and thirteen days after leaving Seattle. 
They were met by Lt. Commander Griida of the Russian 
flotilla, the American Consul at Vladivostock, John K. 
Caldwell, and several others. Major Stanley Washburn 
and interpreter Eugene Prince also joined the Mission 
here. 
What the members of the Root Mission expected to 
see upon their arrival at Vladivostok is unknown. 
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Since the Root Mission was initially conceived, several 
major events had occurred in Russia and in Russian-
American relations. First, from late March through 
April and May thousands of political refugees had 
returned to their native land from several western 
countries, including the United States. 43 The 
internal atmosphere in Russia was one in which all 
those who had opposed the Tsarist regime were viewed 
as heroes. No matter who these individuals were or 
how radical their views, they were welcomed home 
with open arms. Further, the Provisional Government 
paid for their return in many cases. Many of these 
refugees were politically ra0;~a1 in view and most 
were undoubtedly opposed to the war. They had come 
home to change their country, not to die in its army. 
Among their number were included powerful Bolshevik 
leaders Lenin, Trotsky, Borodin, Shatov, and 
Kollontai, and the anarchist, Prince Peter Kropotkin. 
The Provisional Government, still favoring a con-
tinuation of the war to a successful conclusion, 
became concerned as anti-war ranks were swelled. 
There was little the government could do because the 
moderate socialists in the Soviet took the view that 
socialists of any view were their "comrades" and 
could not be criticized openly. One result of the 
influx of radicals was to shift the Russian political 
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spectrum to the left, both within the Soviet and 
throughout the country. 
On May 1, 1917, Foreign Minister Milyukov had 
announced in an internal memo that Russia would 
observe the secret treaties that the Tsar had made 
with the Allies in 1915. The treaties obligated 
Russia not to accept a separate peace and promised 
important territorial gains. The crucial aspect 
of the secret treaties, as far as Russia was con-
cerned, was that in the event of victory, she would 
acquire both Constantinople and control of the 
Dardanelles, principal goals of Russian foreign 
policies for centuries. The Soviet, while not 
necessarily against a continuation of the war, was 
diametrically opposed to territorial aggrandizement. 
Most of its members applied the principle of "peace 
without annexation, without indemnities, and on the 
basi·s of self-determination for all people. 1144 
When Milyukov's note was published, despite the 
Foreign Minister's attempt to keep it secret, the 
conflicting principles of the Foreign Minister and 
large numbers of socialists resulted in an open con-
frontation with both sides staging demonstrations over 
th t t t . 45 e secre rea 1es. 
The socialists won out and forced the resignations 
of Guchkov on May 14 and Milyukov on May 15. 
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The resulting shakeup brought five moderate social-
ists into the cabinet, marking the acceptance of the 
socialists• enormous influence in Russia. The new 
coalition government did not, however, shift its policy 
decisions radically to the left. The change was most 
obvious in semantics; speeches and publications were 
now worded in a manner that was acceptable to the 
. t 46 Sovie . Alexander Kerensky became Minister of War 
and was now the key figure in the government. He was 
a Trudovic, a small non-Marxist faction that usually 
aligned with the moderate Social Revolutionaries, and 
obviously not ready to put many of the major tenets of 
socialism into practice in the Russia of 1917. He was 
the bridge between the government and the Soviet of 
which he was still a member. The other key figure in 
the government was Michael I. Tereschenko who became 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and can be seen as the 
47 leader of the bourgeosis half of the government. 
Both Kerensky and Tereschenko had decided to 
continue the war as long as possible. The acquisi-
tion of Constantinople and the Dardanelles had become 
a political anathma which could not be discussed 
openly. The socialist view of no annexations and no 
indemnities became the government's public stance. 
If there were to be no annexations and no indemnities, 
the war was now one wholly of defense unless occupied 
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"Russian" land in Poland were considered. Thus, 
depending on Russia's desire to retain these land-
holdings, further war could come to an end unless 
Germany attacked or Russia could be persuaded to 
aid her western allies. 48 It was now up to the 
Root Mission to assist the Provisonal Government in 
convincing as large a percentage of Russian society 
as possible that it was in their interest to continue 
the war. It is doubtful that the Mission's members 
realized the extent of opposition to their cause. 
Whatever the Root Mission expected when they 
disembarked at Vladivostok they were quickly enlight-
ened and perhaps rudely awakened by the local politi-
cal scene. Upon disembarking they were met by Mr. N. 
P. Matveev, the President of the local Executive 
Committee. 49 Mr. Matveev inquired as to the Ameri-
cans' purpose. Root responded that the Mission had 
come "to convey to the Russian democracy the good 
will of America, her sister democracy; to seek to 
establish closer cooperation and friendship between 
the two nations, and to assist her in every way 
possible. 1150 
In addition to Matveev the Root party was also 
met by some soldiers and workmen and a representative 
of the City of Vladivostok. It was soon learned that 
neither the city nor the garrison were under the 
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control of the Provisional Government but rather 
directed by various corrunittees elected from among 
their rank and file. Further a group of radical 
socialist refugees who had returned from America 
only a few days ahead of the Buffalo had attempted 
to arouse the local garrison and civilians against 
the Mission. The attempt to turn back the Root 
Mission was defeated in the Vladivostok Soviet. 
Despite the radicals defeat, the Root Mission was 
hurried on board a train after spending only a half 
hour in Vladivostok. 51 This situation must have had 
a profound impact on the Americans as they set out 
for their trip across Siberia to European Russia. 
It should have been useful to the American mission's 
understanding of the Russian situation that its first 
real contact with Russia revealed a city not under 
the control of its national government but in the 
hands of several local committees. In addition, the 
Root party became aware that there was definite oppo-
sition to their mission. It is also important to note 
that the vote of the Vladivostok Soviet was the mis-
sion's first evidence that at least some parts of the 
new Russian democracy were not opposed to the 
Americans, but might take a "wait and see" attitude. 
Nevertheless, if Charles Edward Russell's account is 
accurate, the Bolsheviks had already decided to oppose 
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the American Mission. Russell reported that the 
party hired a train to follow the Root Mission to 
Petrograd and denounce the American at every station 
at which they stoppea. 52 
CHAPTER FOUR 
DEMOCRACY MEETS DEMOCRACY 
WITH A VENGENCE 
-71-
The ten day trip to Petrograd was largely un-
eventful. It included several informative meetings 
with military officials and numerous momentary stops 
where the Mission was met by cheering crowds. These 
were probably taken too seriously. 
On June 4 the Root Mission stopped at Harbin in 
Manchuria where it joined the American Railroad 
Commission. The American ministers were also met by 
General Horvat, govenor of the Chinese Eastern Rail-
road and General Potapov, later a member of the 
Russian Mission to the United States. Potapov claimed 
to have been Russia's first revolutionary general and 
stated that he had great influence with the Soviet. 
Root saw Potapov as "a glaring example" of the un-
fortunate tendency of everyone in Russia to consult 
"his own wishes in obeying any instructions coming 
from what would be considered higher authority." 
The American party left Harbin later in the day after 
meeting with a deputation from the Chinese Foreign 
Minister. 1 
Now riding in the Tsar's Imperial train, which 
included the dining car in which the Tsar had signed 
his abdication, the American Mission reached Irkutsk 
2 
on June 5. Sometime during the fifth Root sent his 
first telegram back to Washington. It read: 
"Indicatious situation critical but not without 
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grounds for hope. 113 Whether this impression had 
come as much from the generals ·as from impressions 
of the situation in Vladivostok is unknown. 
The next few days produced events of a more 
positive nature. Several train loads of women, 
children, and soldiers passed shouting "Hurrah, 
Americanski!," and cheering crowds met the Root 
party at several Siberian town where Root made short 
4 
speeches. 
On June 7 the Mission conferred at Irkutsk with 
Mr. s. Saltykov who was the Chief Commissioner of 
the Siberian Provinces. Saltykov stated that he 
felt the Provisional Government would have a very 
hard time governing while the war continued and 
Russia was experiencing economic and political 
troubles. Ambassador Root's somewhat insensitive 
reply was that "a country's strength comes from hard 
times. " Envoys Russell and Duncan probably made a 
better impression in Irkutsk, receiving loud and 
repeated applause from a large crowd of soldiers and 
5 
workers to whom they spoke. 
The Root party got another glimpse of the "new" 
Russia on June 8 when they passed a train decorated 
with "a number of red placards bearing various 
devices with regard to democracy and freedom. 6 on 
June 9 the Mission was loudly cheered at Novo 
-73-
Nikolaievsky by a large crowd and again at Kanishlov 
on the following day. There Root, Scott, and Russell 
spoke and all received ovations, particularly Russell 
when he removed a small red ribbon from his coat and 
held it aloft. 7 Despite their enthusiastic reception 
the Russian masses of 1917 must have been a rugged 
lot; and in one of the small towns on their way across 
Russia, Root turned to Colonel Mott and observed: 
"Tibby, I am a firm believer in democracy, but I do 
not like filth. 118 
The remainder of the trip was uneventful and 
the American Mission arrived in Petrograd on June 13. 9 
The cross-country train trip to Petrograd demonstrated 
that the Provisiona~ Government had failed to fill 
the void caused by the fall of the old tsarist bureau-
cracy. This had left Russia in a state of "extra-
ordinary decentralization" with both military and 
civilian affairs being conducted by "tens of thou-
sands" of separate committees "having no established 
relations with each other and practically acknowledg-
ing little or no right of control on the part of the 
Petrograd government." Although the Provisional 
Government had been recognized it had yet to exert 
control over the numerous Soviets and other 
committees that had sprung up thoughout the country. 
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Root's appraisal was, however, that revolutionary 
Russia was in an "extraordinary condition" of "good 
10 
order." 
Russia's relative stability was perhaps the 
most outstanding aspect of the interlude between the 
fall of the Tsar and the Bolshevik revolution. With 
the exception of desertions from the army, the great 
mass of the population had been going about their busi-
ness as usual. This situation is noted in a number of 
primary and secondary sources and appears to have 
existed, with a few relatively minor exceptions, 
until mid-July. 11 Nevertheless The Mission's arrival 
in Petrograd must have left the members wondering 
if the Provisional Government had any kind of 
organizational ability whatsoever. Dmitri Fedotoff-
White, a young Russian Naval officer who had been 
assigned to the Root Mission as a guide and interpreter, 
described the scene of the Mission's arrival. There was 
no band present. It had probably refused to be bothered. 
The honor guard was "untidy" and in khaki uniforms 
"blended perfectly with the dirty yellow walls of the 
station" and thus went totally unnoticed by :.hE' 
.. t 12 American v1s1 ors. 
The reception presented a striking contrast. 
The Americans, who wore formal attire, were greeted 
by Prime Minister Lvov, Foreign Minister Tereschenko, 
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Finance Minister Shingarev and Communications 
Minister Nekrassoff, all of whom wore simple business 
suites. Prince Lvov was the worst offender, wear-
ing "a badly cut sack suit." Perhaps what was most 
noticeable was "the intense earnestness visible on 
every face. The members of the Russian Cabinet had 
a drawn, worn, tired look, as of men overworked, 
weighted with a tremendous responsibility, and suffer-
ing from its strain." It was "democracy greeting 
democracy with a vengence. 1113 
Ambassador Francis was characteristically 
enthusiastic and undoubtedly delighted to see his fel-
14 low countrymen. Francis introduced the American 
Mission as representing "every phase of political 
belief" in the United States and went on to state that 
there were "no classes in America." This latter re-
mark brought out "a few furtive grins among the solemn 
faces·of the audience. 1115 
Ambassador Root followed Francis with a speech 
of his own. It was one that would be typical of the 
approach of the American Mission. Root first con-
gratulated the Russians on their achievement of 
democracy and then went on to encourage them to con-
tinue the war. 16 As Root's speech came to an end 
socialist Minister A. V. Peshekhonov asked Fedotoff-
White to "please tell these Americans that we are 
tired of 1this war. Explain to them that we are weary 
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of the long and bloody struggle." Although White 
declined to translate the message and the Americans 
were unaware of what had been said, it was sympto-
matic of the basic conflict of interests involved. 17 
The Americans wanted an active eastern front to keep 
the pressure on Germany. The Russians were tired of 
war with good reason, and if they took the socialist 
view that there were to be no annexations or 
indemnities there was nothing to fight for; they 
would fight only if the Germans attacked. The Ger-
mans had undoubtedly decided that they could not 
reasonably spare the troops to attempt a major 
attack on Russia, nor did their strategy require it. 
They would not attack. Nonetheless the American mis-
sion had to try for there was, of course, no guarantee 
that the Germans could be beaten with or without 
Russia. 
Dmitri Fedotoff-White described this perception 
of the Americans' attitude: 
"On the whole the attitude of some of the 
members of the Mission was not unlike that 
of a lot of missionaries descending • 
in the beginning of the nineteenth century 
upon a tribe of benighted savages on some 
Pacific island to bring to them the bless-
ings of the white man's civilization and 
deriving a great deal of satisfaction from 
the flattering notion that the Lord had 
made them from other clay than the poor 
heathens they were about to proselytise.18 
Fedotoff-White felt that the majority of the Root 
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Mission looked upon the Russians as "a lot of like-
able but unreliable and sometimes very naughty 
children." On the other occasions Fedotoff-White 
cited a "senior attache" who lectured him on the 
prevalance of syphillis and the lack of "moral 
restraint" among the villagers and the general 
attitude among the Mission members that "All senior 
officer were either grafters, incompetents or 
libertines, interested only in making love to 
ballerinas. 1119 
There was, undoubtedly, some general truth in 
these views despite their offensiveness to Fedotoff-
White and any other Russians who might have discerned 
them. That Russia was not ready for democracy of the 
western type should have been obvious. After centuries 
of Tsarist tyranny the largely illiterate population 
lacked many qualities, such as education and democratic 
experience, that are often considered necessary 
for Western democratic government. However, there 
good behavior in the absence of either police or 
unified leadership was undeniable. 20 
on Thursday, June 14, 1917, the Americans met 
with the foreign and domestic press and visited 
Foreign Minister Tereschenko whom Root described as 
"tall and impressive," highly intelligent and 
. . t. 21 imagina ive. Afterwards the military members of the 
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American mission called on War Minister Alexander 
Kerensky. The Americans were surprised to find 
the Russian War Minister wearing "very rough khaki 
colored cloths" with his arm in a sling from shaking 
hands with the troops. Root and General Scott visited 
the British Ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, in the 
late afternoon. 22 
The following day saw the Root Mission again 
receive the press in the morning. Root lunched with 
Francis, Prince Lvov, and Tereschenko. In the even-
ing the entire Mission was formally presented to the 
Provisional Government. 23 Root and Tereschenko gave 
major addresses. Ambassador Root's speech stressed 
that "one fearful danger threatens the liberty" of 
both Russia and America - the German military auto-
cracy. The American democracy, although not directly 
threatened, was preparing to fight for both nations' 
f d . 24 ree om. The obvious implication was that America 
had joined the conflict to put an end to autocracy 
and war and that she had no other self-interested 
motives. 
Tereschenko replied on behalf of the Provisional 
Government emphasizing the unity of purpose of newly 
democratic Russia and the United States; both as 
fellow democracies and partners in a war against auto-
cracy. Treschenko went on to attack German militarisn 
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and "imperialistic schemes." The Russian Minister 
was very careful not to offend the Soviet. 25 Arnbas-
sador Root had either perceived the situation or had 
been informed of it by the government and had made a 
careful reference to American support of the "right 
of self-determination of all nations." Copies of 
both speeches were sent to the President through 
L . 26 ans1ng. 
On June 17th, a New York Times reporter who was 
covering the Mission would report that it was "in this 
direction of thrashing out the question of the aims 
of the war that the chief province of the Mission 
will lie. 1127 This was not to be the case. Wilson 
appears to have already been preoccupied with the 
peace that would follow the "war to end all wars." 
As soon as he received a copy of Root's speech the 
President instructed Lansing to wire Petrograd in 
order to caution the members of the commission against 
speaking about "the terms of peace or of settlement 
which will be insisted on by the United States. The 
President is himself reserving all such utterances 
until very different circumstances arise, and hopes 
that you will pursue the same policy. 1128 
Whether or not Wilson was overreacting, the 
effect of his action was to tie the hand of the Com-
mission on this crucial issue. The question of war 
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aims was probably the parmount issue of the intel-
lectuals of the Soviet and it had been this issue 
that had forced the resignations of Milyukov and 
Guchkov. The Soviet and the majority of the Russian 
population would not accept a war of conquest or in-
demnity. The inability of the members of the Root 
Mission to speak to this crucial issue played into 
the hands of those who desired to discredit the 
motives of the Allied governments. The most ironic 
aspect of this situation was that President Wilson's 
policy at Versailles on these issues was similar to 
that of the Russian Soviet. It was unfortunate 
that the President's failure to adequately articulate 
American was aims before June undermined the credi-
bility of the Root Mission and therefore of America. 
It was not that the President was unaware of the 
position of the Soviet, the fact that Tereschenko 
and Kerensky desperately desired to appease that body 
on these issues, nor that Root had taken the position 
that Tereschenko and Kerensky undoubtedly hoped he 
would take. There is no evidence that Root had 
discussed his speech with members of the Provivional 
Government. 
The President's extreme caution on the issue of 
war aims may be attributable to his desires to avoid 
speaking for or offending Britian, France and the 
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11 . 29 dd. . a ies. In a 1t1on he may not have been able to 
perceive the disasterous effect his actions would 
have on Root Mission and American credibility. It 
is highly doubtful whether Wilson had, at this 
point, and understanding of the true nature of the 
Russian situation. He therefore gravely under-
estimated the potential importance of the Root Mis-
sion. More importantly, the President may have 
failed to understand the importance of Russia in his 
over-all concept of world-wide democracy. Unfortunately 
a continuation of the war and the triump of Russian 
liberal - nationalistic democracy appear to have been 
mutually exclusive. 30 
After the formalities of the first two days the 
Ambassadors spent the next six days meeting with 
and gathering information from Tereschenko, former 
War Minister Guchkov, British Labour Party minister, 
Arthur Henderson, and numerous other Russians, Allies, 
and members of the American business community in 
Petrograd. 
In order to cover the various areas of Russian 
society the Mission's members split up with each 
one working on his own specialized areas in the hope 
of producing an overview in the report. This approach 
allowed the American Mission to cover a much broader 
spectrum of Russian society, investigating the 
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financial, military, labor, religious and political 
affairs of Russia in much greater depth than would 
have been otherwise possible. Although this system 
proved to be somewhat disorganized, due more perhaps 
to time limitations than anything else, its principal 
fault can perhaps be found in its failure to expose 
most members of the Mission to the Russian masses 
and their power center, the Soviet. Only Charles 
Russell and James Duncan would visit that body. 
While this lack of exposure to these crucial 
areas may have colored the final report and overall 
impressions of the members of the American Mission, 
that job was really one to be undertaken by those 
administration and state Department officials who 
were more familiar with the intricacies of the Rus-
sian scene and were stationed in Russia on a full-
time basis. 
Ambassador Root spent his initial period in 
Petrograd meeting with partisans of the old govern-
ment, the new government, Russian and American busi-
a · l' t 31 It b b . nessmen an JOUrna 1s s. soon ecame o v1ous 
to Root and others of the party that the situation 
in Petrograd was discouraging. This view was con-
tained in Root's first Petrograd report to Lansing 
which was very pessimistic: 
"Conditions here critical, general St. 
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Petersburg opinion very pessimistic; 
industrial and financial conditions 
bad; Provisional Government seems 
secure; no visible agitation against 
it at present. Government very con-
fident of pulling the country through." 
The "fundamental" problem according to 
Root's view was that the soldiers had 
"interpreted new freedom as meaning 
that every man could do as he pleased" 
and "refused spoken orders from any-
one. Accordingly authority of officers 
has been repudiated and military dis-
cipline has practically failed." Root 
laid the blame for this situation on 
"a tremendous German propaganda" and 
the "extreme socialists who are for 
peace at any price and very active." 
Although some elements did favor a con-
tinuation of the war effort, Root con-
cluded accurately that the decision 
rested with the soldiers and "we have 
got to get at them in someway. 11 32 
Whether Root correctly interpreted the optimism 
of the Provisional Government ii open to question. 
Dmitri Fedotoff-White felt that the more realistic 
members did not think Russia could continue. 33 
Kerensky and Tereschenko did however, and they were 
working very hard to rally the country behind them. 34 
To support their efforts Root proposed to Washington 
a massive publicity campaign costing "at least 
$5,000,000 11 and featuring newspapers, pamphlets, 
posters, public speakers, and motion pictures. In 
addition, he advocated the establishment of Y.M.C.A. 
stations along the Russian front and went on to ask 
for an immediate funding of $100,000 to begin the 
campaign. 35 Root was not alone in his view; surpris-
~---
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ingly the majority of the Root Mission had already 
made up their minds about what should be done to aid 
Russia. The Mission 1 s consensus would appear to have 
been that if the Russians were unwilling to continue 
the war the Americans could not invest extensively 
in Russia. Russell had advanced this position as 
early as May 31 while still on board the Buffalo. 36 
The specific idea of an all-out propaganda 
campaign was conceived as early as June 11 when 
Stanley Washburn brought up the idea, arguing that 
it was a very close decision whether the Russians 
would continue the war. On June 12, while still on 
board the train to Petrograd, the Mission held a 
general conference on the subject at Russell's urging. 
Washburn introduced his plan to begin the effort 
immediately and in conjunction with the British. 
There was general agreement on this and Washburn and 
Russell began work on it at once. 37 Thus Root's plan 
had been some time in the making before he cabled his 
ideas to Lansing. Obviously, the Ambassador believed 
the situation to be critical and expected a prompt 
response that was not forthcoming. 
In the interim Root continued his numerous meet-
ings and speeches. Root's speeches presented the 
basic theme of the official American viewpoint: the 
United States was pleased with the Russian Revolution, 
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at least as it was understood in America, and in-
tended to help the new Russian·democracy. Germany 
was the enemy of democracy and of the essential 
interests of both America and Russia. Ambassador 
Root and the other members of the Commission made 
clear with varying degrees of subtlety that American 
aid to Russia was essentially predicated on Russia's 
continuation of the war. 38 
While Root concentrated on the upper echelons 
of the Provisional Government and other Allied 
representatives, Samuel R. Bertron and Cyrus 
McCormick were given the job of acquiring an under-
standing of Russia's financial problems and needs. 
Neither man appears to have left any detailed record 
of h:is activities or impressions outside of the of-
ficial reports of the Mission. 39 
The financial needs of the new government were 
massive. On May 16 the United States had established 
a $100 million credit at 3% interest per year. Upon 
receiving the credit the Russians immediately ordered 
500 locomotives and 10,000 freight cars which they 
desperately needed. The first American credit was 
due to mature on June 30, 1917 but would be funded by 
a larger credit on that date. 40 It was the task of 
McCormick and Bertron to determine further Russian 
needs. 
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In persuit of their mission the two American 
businessmen met with Finance Minister A. I. Shingarev 
on numerous occasions, Acting Minister of Commerce 
and Industry Stepanov, Frank Corse of the New York 
Life Insurance Company, and Professor Emory, the 
Hussian representative of the GuaI"anty Tru:;t co. 
out of these meetings McCormick and nerton came up 
with what they called a "comprehensive statement" of 
Russia's financial needs. 41 
McCormick made no public addresses and, except 
for the meetings required to get a view of Russian 
economic needs, he was, according to Dmitri Fcdotoff-
White, concerned only with "looking after the interests 
of his harvesters." That Fedotoff-\oihite was unim-
pressed by the harvester heir is an understatement: 
he found McCormick rude and bad mannered: "a cunning 
old merchant. 1142 
Berton was more active than McCormick. Although 
he made no pub! ic addresses, the ::cw York banker 
participated in the negotiations of transJX>rtation 
problems and was active in organizing the propaganda 
campaign. He appears to have been or become a con-
fidant of Root on this trip. Berton left little 
record of his impressions of the mission. He was 
obviously in favor of the progaganda campaign and 
concurred with the Root Mission's final report. 43 
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Dmitri Fedotoff-White could remember very little 
about Bertron except that he was "obsessed" with 
informing the Russians about America's part in the 
war.
44 Samuel R. Bertron was certainly the most 
obscure member of the mission although he may have 
actually done more real work behind the scenes than 
several of the other members. 45 
Charles R. Crane was another member of the Root 
Mission whose activities in Russia remain partially 
obscured. Crane was born on August 7, 1858, in 
Chicago. His father, Richard Teller Crane, had been 
unencumbered by formal schooling and he decided that 
his . son Charles should not be allowed to go beyond 
the eighth grade. Charles worked for the Crane 
Company for many years, but eventually sold his 
interest in it to his brother Richard after the 
death of their father. This transaction left Charles 
Crane with $12 million with which to travel and 
influence world politics. 
Crane had long been interested in Russia, China, 
and the Middle Eastern countries. Originally a 
Republican of progressive leanings, he was made 
American Minister to China in 1909, undoubtedly as 
a reward for his efforts in Republican financing. 
Crane promptly attacked the Sino-Japanese treaty 
of that year and President Taft was forced to recall 
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him at the insistence of Secretary of State 
46 Philander C. Knox·. 
Charles Crane's interests in Russia centered 
around the Russian Orthodox Church, Russian art 
and architecture, and the Russian aristocracy, with 
whom he had many contacts. Mrs. Madden Summers, 
wife of the American Consil at Moscow described his 
knowledge of Russia as "superficial". Charles 
Crane's knowledge and personality were indeed 
unusual. He had the charm of an aristocrat and 
"was gifted with an extraordinary sensitivity to 
47 
men and what they stood for. Although his per-
sonal interests and emphasis were mainly cultural, 
Crane seemed to have often gravitated to politics. 
He travelled extensively and was often rumored to 
have been financing political factions including 
sun Yat-sen, an Albanian uprising, and Syrian and 
Lebanese revolts against French colonialism. 48 At 
one time he attempted to buy out the entirety of 
d . b. 'l . t t 49 Sau i Ar ian 01 in eres s. 
crane's activities while in Russia in 1917 
remain somewhat of a mystery. On his, previous 
trips to Russia he had cultivated a close friend-
ship with Professor Milyukov. 50 In the absence of 
further evidence, he should be seen as a supporter, 
if onlv in soirit, of Milyukov's Cadet Party. 
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Crane sailed for Russia soon after the March 
Revolution. On March 27 he boarded the Norwegian 
Christianiaford, accompanied by famous muckraker 
Lincoln Steffens. 51 This was the same vessel on 
which Trotsky attempted to sail, but he was forced 
to disembark at Halifax, Nova Scotia. Crane arrived 
in Russia, via the Baltic, in later April and in 
time to witness the downfall of his good friend 
Milyukov. This activities during May are obscure, 
but there is some evidence that, through the efforts 
of Steffens, he visited the Petrograd Soviet. 52 
Crane, who apparently went to Russia as Wilson's 
observer, was not appointed to the Root Mission 
until after his arrival there. 53 
With the arrival of the Root Mission later in 
May, Crane joined Dr. John R. Mott on his trip to 
Moscow and accompanied the YMCA Leader on most of 
his activities. Little mention of him is made in 
h 1 f th M. . 54 t e og o e iss1on. Crane's initial impression 
of the Russian situation is contained in a telegram 
sent to his son Richard, .Lansing's secretary, on 
May 14, 1917. Crane instructed his son to tell Dr. 
Mott that the Orthodox Church "had no part in Revolu-
tion which is entirely socialistic and material in 
aims. However, Revolution now going on in Church 
II Those Bishops who had been elevated or 
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held power under the influence of Rasputin were on 
the way out and the new hierarchy "will probably 
be socialistic certainly democratic and free and 
Bishops will have to come down to people for support 
and inspiration. Much spiritual agitation and 
apocalypse widely studied. 1155 
Crane left little further evidence of his 
thoughts on the Revolution during this early period. 
Dmitre Fedotoff-White in the last entry that is 
purported to have been taken directly from his diary 
described Crane as "very absent-minded . II 
always inunersed in thought and dreams." White went 
on to note that despite this, "he seems to be the 
only member of the Mission who had a more or less 
clear idea of what it is all about. 56 
By mid-June Crane had obviously become concerned 
at the course the revolution was taking. In fact he 
was so concerned that he asked Lincoln Steffens to 
return to Washington to carry a message to Wilson. 
Crane said that he, Francis, and Kerensky had cabled 
Wilson "in vain; they could not make the President 
understand that public opinion reigned in Russia and 
that the new government had no power to do what the 
allies wished. 1157 Steffens agreed to go, whereupon 
he met twice with Kerensky. During these meetings, 
Kerensky stated his view that the Russian people 
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would not fight unless the secret treaties, which 
were widely believed to exisf, were repudiated. 
Public opinion in Russia might be directed, 
Kerensky thought, but not by him. The 
President might steer it back to the war --
he and the allies, if Wilson could manage 
the allies. Nobody but President Wilson 
can answer that German charge and destroy 
that belief in the simple minds of the 
Russian peasants.~8 
On June 26 Steffens, armed with letters from Crane 
and Francis, met with the President. "I delivered 
my message to a silent, thoughtful man." Wilson 
"knew nothing about the secret treaties. But the 
way he said it and what he meant was clearly under-
standable to me ••• He knew of those secret treaties, 
not as an ally, not officially.as a party ••• but 
only as I and the public knew of their existence." 
Wilson went on to say that if the United States had 
been a party to their making he could request the 
public abrogation which Kerensky needed so badly. 
Wilson was not in that position and didn't feel he 
could do what Kerensky wanted: "N.o, that is hard. 
That I cannot very well do. 1159 Thus ended the 
attempts of Kerensky, Crane, and to a lesser extent, 
Francis, to persuade Wilson to take the lead on war 
aims and give the Russian people a cause to fight 
for. Wilson's inaction here is another possible 
miscalculation in America's relations with Russia 
during tbe revolutionary period. Of all the members 
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of the Root Mission, Charles Crane seems to have had 
the most influence on Wilson's policy decisions 
regarding Russia. 60 The failure of Crane's personal 
agent to persuade the President to take action must 
be seen as the de facto conclusion of the issue. If 
Steffen's account is accurate, this was obviously a 
question of priorities in the mind of the President. 
Wilson decided that he would rather not risk dis-
agreements with his allies than take this step 
towards uniting the Russian people behind Kerensky. 
In fact the President appears to have seen 
the texts of some of the secret treaties and at 
least to have discussed them with Arthur Balfour 
during April, 1917. It was most probably on the 
basis of this knowledge that the President wrote 
House on July 21: 
England and France have not the same views 
with regard to peace that we have by any 
means. When the war is over we can force 
them to our way of thinking, because by 
that time they will among other things be 
financially in our hands: but we cannot 
force them now, and any attempt to speak 61 for them ..• would bring on disagreements. 
This statement serves to explain Wilson's muzzle-
ing of the Root Mission, his reticence on war aims, 
and his negative response to Steffens. Nonetheless, 
these were serious mistakes. Wilson, Lansing, Francis 
and others all knew that the Russian Army was in 
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rearming and releasing of the Bolsheviks and their 
leaders. When Charles Crane arrived in Sweden in 
late September he told an American report that 
the Russians "are losing the proper sense of their 
position in the scheme of worldly affairs." Further, 
"extensive and laborious repairs are necessary." 
It would become a test of strength between the 
Bolsheviks and the workers with their "ignorance of 
economics" and the "more conservative peasant 
62 farmers." 
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE GREAT ORATORS 
i-------
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While the main body of the Root Mission remained 
largely in Petrograd, various members of the Mission 
travelled extensively. Dr. John R. Mott and Charles 
R. Crane, who had the best contacts in Russia of the 
major members of the Mission, journeyed to Moscow. 
General Scott travelled to the front and Roumania. 
Admiral Glennon toured both the Baltic and Black Sea 
fleets. Mott, Scott, and Glennon had perhaps the 
most interesting experiences of all the Mission's 
members and perhaps the greatest short-term influence 
on Russia. 
Dr. John R. Mott saw his purpose in Russia as 
that of "cultivating" what he considered the heart 
of Russia, the Russian Orthodox Church. 1 Dr. Mott's 
first contact with that church had occurred in 1897 
in Tokyo when he had met with Russian Orthodox 
Archbishop Nicolai of Japan. In 1909, as a leader 
of the YMCA and member of the World Student Chris-
tian Federation, Dr. Mott participated in the world-
wide student evangelistic meetings which were held 
in Russia. Later, he learned that the Holy Synod 
had passed a resolution that he was not to be permit-
ted to visit Russia for religious purposes again. 
The cause for this attitude is unknown but is prob-
ably a sign that the Tsarist dominated Church was 
apprehensive about any movements that were not its 
-95-
2 
own. Undeterred, Dr. Mott held the meetings of 
the w.s.c.F. in Constantinople· in 1911 so that some 
of the Orthodox leaders that he ·had met in 1909 could 
attend and some did. 3 
Once in Russia, John R. Mott concentrated on 
observing the new democracy and attempting to per-
suade the Russian Orthodox Church to take a leading 
role in Russian political affairs and to support the 
Russian war effort. 4 Through his contacts with 
Charles Crane, Mott knew that although the Church 
had taken no part in the March Revolution, it was 
undergoing an internal upheaval. The major outward 
result of this was the ouster of Bishops who had 
been appointed by Rasputin. Crane had felt that in 
the new Orthodox Church the Bishops would have "to 
come down to (the) people for support and inspira-
tion." Further there was much "spiritual agitation 
and the apocalypse (was) widely studied. 115 
After spending the first few days in Petrograd, 
Dr. Mott and Crane set out for Moscow where they 
witnessed the first National Sobor (convention) of 
the Russian Orthodox Church in nearly 250 years. On 
June 19 Mott addressed this body. He stressed the 
importance of the Orthodox Church taking a role in 
political affairs. He contended that the Church had 
held the Russian nation together in the past and 
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that it was the Church that must assert itself now 
if Russia were to be saved from internal disintegra-
tion. Nevertheless Dr. Mott placed great emphasis 
on the continuation of the war: "We are deeply 
grateful because of what you are proposing and plan-
ning to do to continue this struggle to a successful 
conclusion." Mott went on' to encourage the Russians 
with an account of American war preparations and its 
commitment to the cause of the democracies. He 
6 
received loud applause. While in Moscow, Mott had 
eight lengthy interviews with Prince Vladimir Lvov, 
the High Procurator of the Orthodox Church. Lvov, 
who was technically a member of the Provisional 
Government and well informed on Russian political 
events, discussed the problems facing both the Church 
d th R ' t' 7 an e ussian na ion. 
After these meetings Mott and Crane returned to 
Petrograd where they attended the meetings of the 
Holy Governing Synod of the Orthodox Church. Dr. 
Mott was able to participate in the deliberations of 
the council of that body which was the process of 
revising the constitution of the Church. 8 Mott also 
participated in the deliberations of the Commission 
on the Revision of the Curriculum of the Ecclesiasti-
cal Academies and Seminaries. Dr. Mott spent much of 
the balance of his time in Russia holding private 
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interviews with various religious leaders and visit-
ing seminaries and monasteries. He did not confine 
himself to the Russian Orthodox Church. He visited 
with all the major Protestant leaders except those 
of the Lutherans, three of the most influential 
Jewish leaders, and Bishop Ciplack the leader of 
the Polish Roman Catholics. One of the meetings 
that Dr. Mott enjoyed the most, according to his 
biographer, was that with the leading Bishops of 
the Old Believers, the twelve million member sect 
that included among their number about half of the 
Cossacks. This group had been persecuted for cen-
turies due to their adherence to an earlier brand 
of Christianity. 9 On June 27 Dr. Mott, James Duncan, 
and Samuel Harper visited the Cossack Congress in 
Petrograd. This group was significant both because 
of their fierce independence and their military 
abilities. Although he came uninvited, Dr. Mott 
was able to talk to numerous delegates and address 
the conference. Mott's address struck the usual 
theme, emphasizing the American interest in the con-
tinuation of the war. 10 According to his report 
Dr. Mott received an "enormous ovation" and the 
Cossacks passed a resolution supporting an immediate 
offensive against Germany in order to "consolidate 
the conquests of the revolution. 1111 
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Mott also began the organization of YMCA 
sponsored camps in the major garrison cities of 
Petrograd, Moscow, Kiev~ and Jassy in Roumania. 
He believed that the idleness of the Russian Army 
was a major factor in its declining discipline and 
morale. Working in connection with Mr. Archibald 
Harte, the YMCA's chief representative in Russia, 
Dr. Mott began organizing and instructing those 
American Prison Camp secretaries who had not already 
b t . . th' 12 Aft h' t t ecome ac ive in is area. er is re urn o 
America Dr. Mott would continue to work on the YMCA 
angle until the Bolshevik revolution in October. 
Charles R. Crane described Dr. Mott's selection 
as "amply justified" and characterized the Christian 
leader's efforts as "the really great and inspiring 
and permanent achievement of the Corrunission. 11 
Crane felt that Mott's addresses to the Orthodox 
Church in Moscow and that to the Old Believers had 
a profound impact. 13 Although Dr. Mott was very 
active while in Russia and his speeches were undoubt-
edly effective, particularly the one he made to the 
Cossacks, Charles Crane's estimate of the YMCA 
leader's effect was an understandable exaggeration. 
Dr. Mott's stated goal of persuading the Orthodox 
Church to take a more active role in Russian politics 
went unfulfilled. Although there is little doubt 
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he had a strong impact on the Orthodox, the Old 
Believers, and the Cossacks, only the latter group 
was probably in a position to have a profound impact 
on Russian events. The Orthodox Church did not 
have a strong tradition of activism in Russian poli-
tics, had little influence over the minds of the 
proletariat, and had been closely tied to the 
Tsarist Monarchy in the minds of many Russians. 
Thus Mott's speeches and YMCA activities, despite 
some positive impact, appear too little in quantity 
and too late to be effective. 14 Part of the reason 
for this was that the time limitation placed upon 
him was severe, and it was hardly Mott's fault that 
the areas of Russian society where he had the great-
est influence were not the areas that would have a 
major impact on the course of Russian history at 
that time. His lasting impact must be seen as con-
f . a th h t d · a f · d" ·d 1 15 ine to e ear s an min s o in ivi ua s. 
Dr. Mott returned to America sharing the view 
of the majority of the Root Mission that Russia 
could be kept in the war with the aid of American 
money, propaganda, and the YMCA camps. He was per-
haps brought to this view by his interviews with 
Procurator Lvov and the very positive responses 
h h . h . d 16 t at is pro-war speec es receive . 
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wasted no time in delivering his interpretation of 
the American position in the most blunt terms. Scott 
stated that if he sent such a telegram the President 
would inquire when the Russians would make an advance 
on the western front. "What would I answer?" asked 
the American General. Manikovsky, now grasping fully 
the Americans' terms for economic and military assist-
ance, promised an advance in the near future. General 
Scott replied that he would telegram the President 
in the near future. 18 
Having been told of Russia's basic needs Scott 
set out for Russian military headquarters (Stafka) 
at Mogilev on June 27. He was accompanied by 
Ambassador Root, Dr. Mott, Colonels Judson and Mott, 
and Lieutenant Michie. The American contingent was 
entertained by General Brusilov who held a reception 
and dinner in their honor and spent several hours 
discussing the military situation. Brusilov then 
outlined his plans for the Russian advance which was 
to begin in four days. Scott did not record his 
impressions of Brusilov or the proposed advance, 
but by the time the American general left Russia 
the advance, although, initially successful, had 
begun to collapse and the telegram Scott had promised 
was never sent. 19 
U:;;;;,:;y 
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Perhaps the most interesting part of General 
Scott's mission did not occur fn Russia but in 
Roumania. The Roumanians formed an important link 
on the eastern front. Unfortunately they had be-
come bottled up around Jassy and had lost two thirds 
of their pre-war territory. Nevertheless they 
possessed fifteen divisions, ten of which were 
considered to be in very good fighting condition. 
Perhaps more importantly the spirit of these units 
had a positive effect on the Russian soldiers around 
them. 20 
Scott set out for Roumania the day after meeting 
with Brusilof, accompanied by Judson, Colonel Mott, 
Michie, and Major Parker, a military observer con-
nected with the American legation in Roumania. When 
it arrived in Jassy, the Scott party met with 
Roumanian Prime Minister Ion Bratinau, the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, the Army Chief of Staff, and 
American Consul William Andrews. 21 
The American party attended a lunch with King 
Ferdinand I and his Queen after which General Scott 
suffered an embarrassing moment. When he found him-
self alone with the King, as protocol dictated, 
neither he nor the Roumanian monarch could think of 
a "single word to say to the other". After several 
moments of silence the King turned and went to the 
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Queen's side. Colonel Mott came to the General's 
.d 22 ai • Undoubtedly embarrassed by this incident, 
General Scott redeemed himself nicely soon there-
after when he was given an opportunity to speak to 
the assembled members of the cabinet, the royal 
family, and various members of the parliament. The 
aging general had perhaps his finest hour giving a 
rousing speech in which he declared that America had 
mobilized eleven million men, twenty thousand 
aeroplanes, and voted billions of dollars for war. 
All of this was a rather large exaggeration and 
Scott knew it. The Roumanians responded with cheer-
ing and thunderous applause. The Prime Minister 
declared it to have been a tremendous success and 
Consul Andrews agreed that "no other speech of 
official visitors had the value for them {the 
Roumanians) which the speech of General Scott 
carried." In a cable to Washington, however, 
Andrews noted that Scott's speech had had the unfor-
tunate side effect ''of giving the Roumanians the 
idea that the United States would give them every-
thing they are asking for" and warned that the 
United States might be embarrassed by this in the 
near future. 23 At very least the Scott visit to 
Roumania had boosted morale at a critical time; 
and the General seems to have had, according to 
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Colonel Mott, every intention of carrying out his 
promises to the Roumanians. By the time he returned 
to America, however, he had forgotten exactly what 
these promises were. 24 
General Scott's view of the Russian government, 
gathered from meetings with Kerensky, Manikovsky, 
and others both before and after his trip to 
Roumania, was less positive. In Scott's eyes 
"radicalism pervaded the whole government to a 
dangerous degree," and on one occasion he went so 
far as to advise Kerensky to "execute about one 
hundred of these German agitators like ••. Lenin 
and Trotsky, or at least deport them. 25 
Unlike most of his compatriots, Scott was 
able to perceive that "all" of Russia was tired of 
the war. Whether the majority desired peace at any 
price was a question as yet unanswered in his mind. 
Further he was unsure whether the Provisional 
Government had the capacity to restore order and 
continue the war. But the General also recognized 
that Russia's presence in the war would be of immense 
value. In his report Scott expressed his fears that 
if Russia withdrew it would be "hard to predict how 
long it will take to win" and it was "possible that 
26 Germany can't be conquered" at all. 
General Scott concluded that it would be worth 
the cost of substantial American war loans to keep 
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Russia "even passively in the war until next spring" 
and hope that she could launch an attack during the 
following surruner. Scott went on to recorrunend that 
the United States take over Vladivostok as an 
American base for purposes of supplying Russia as 
it was in "total confusion. 1127 Scott's analysis 
seems to have been as close to approximating a 
reasonable American approach to the situation as 
anyone's. From a military viewpoint America could 
aid Russia primarily with her transportation prob-
lems. The confusion of this system not only made 
it difficult to supply the Army but also endangered 
the supply of food and other necessities. This 
could give rise to ~nternal disorder. Further, as 
an assistant to Kerensky had pointed out, any advance 
was likely to exaggerate the supply problem. 28 In 
his official report Scott advocated a loan of $300 
million for Roumania. The American General concluded 
that Roumania's fate was inexorably tied to that of 
Russia and thus it was important to keep the ten 
strong Roumanian divisions in the field because of 
their positive influence on nearby Russian divisions. 29 
Admiral James F. Glennon had perhaps the most 
exciting adventures and the most significant short-
term impact on Russia of any of the American Envoys. 
After soendinq several days in Petrograd, Glennon, 
-106-
accompanied by Dr. Holton Curl, Lieutenant Alva 
Bernhard, Captain Newton Mccully, out-qoing American 
Naval Attache at Petrograd, Commander Walter s. 
Crosley, his replacement, and Dmitri Fcdotoff-White 
set out to visit the Black Sea Flcet. 30 
Before the Glennon party reached the Black Sea 
they were given their first taste of Russia's internal 
dissension. The party was stopped at one of the 
larger stations to the south of Moscow to purchase 
tonic water when a burly soldier rushed their car 
yelling "throw the damn bourgeois out!" As the 
attacker lept into the car, Fedotoff-White, somewhat 
to his surprise, struck the intruder in the face and 
sent him flying. Luckily for all concerned the 
31 
crowd of troops on hand. This first taste of revo-
lutionary Russia was soon followed by another. 
Within several miles of Sebastopol the A~cricans 
heard rumors of a revolt in the Black Sea Fleet. 
Unlike their Baltic counterparts, the southern fleet 
had been stable since the beginning of the rcvolu-
tion. Fedotoff-White was obviously shocked and 
saddened to find that "the last citadel of order and 
discipline in the Russian ~:avy was in the hands of 
the Bolsheviks ... 32 
When they arrived in Sebastopol, the Haval party 
found that the fleet's com."':lilnder. Admiral Kolchak, 
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later to become a leader of the White Russian forces, 
had been deposed but was free and unharmed. The 
fleet seems to have been under the loose control of 
various Soviets and other ad hoc groups, some un-
doubtedly Bolshevik in sentiment and heavily inf lu-
enced by "outside agitators" from the Baltic Fleet. 
In an atmosphere of "profound distruct" the local 
Executive of Soldiers, Sailors and Working Meen had 
voted not to support the Provisional Government. 33 
Incredibly, Admiral Glennon was able to restore 
order in the Fleet. Glennon first met with the 
executive of the Soviet and was so well received that 
he was invited to address the entire soviet of 1,200 
members later in the day. Like General Scott, Glennon 
seems to have known what to say and when. His speech 
began with praise for Admiral Kolchak and emphasized 
the discipline, self-restraint, and military record 
of the American Navy. When he had finished the Soviet 
was persuaded to restore the arms and authority of 
the officers and arrest some of the worst agitators. 
The Soviet's executive committee reversed their 
earlier vote and backed the Provisional Government 
f . t 34 by a vote o six y to three. Although he was 
unable to prevent Kolchak's recall to Petrograd, the 
American Admiral's performance was not only heroic 
and inspiring: it was incredible. It is surprising 
-108-
that he undertook to reverse the positicins of the 
Soviet and even more so that he met with such sue-
cess. 
The incident demonstrated how truly malleable 
many Russians were at this time. There was on one 
hand strong and genuine fear of the officer class. 
This had certainly been agitated by the prevalent 
view that Russia's defeats were the result of a 
pro-German conspiracy within the Tsar's government. 
On the other hand while there were undoubtedly quite 
a few incidents of officers mistreating their men, 
there were also unquestionably many well-intentioned 
officers who posed no threat to the soldiers and 
sailors. 35 It was in any event an atmosphere of 
great distrust. Certainly Glennon must have come 
away from the incident feeling that Russian extrem-
ists could be persuaded to moderate their views if 
they could be exposed to viewpoints similar to his 
own. After their successes with the Black Sea 
Fleet, Glennon and his party travelled to the north-
ern ports of Archangel, Roggekuel, Reval, and Helsing-
fors. They were accompained part of the way by 
Admiral Kolchak with whom Glennon discussed the 
Russian Naval situation. The Baltic Fleet had 
already established its reputation for radicalism 
and violence in March when it revolted and attempted 
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to set up government by soviets. Dmitri Fedotoff-
White's former commander, Admiral Nepenin, had been 
murdered in the process. There had been several 
other major incidents since then, and it is safe to 
say that the Baltic Fleet as well as various local 
workers soviets were constantly on the verge of 
going over to the Bolshevik cause and declaring 
themselves independent of the Provisional Government. 
After their experiences with the Black Sea Fleet 
the Glennon party must have entered the Baltic area 
·th t ·a t· 36 wi some repi a ion. 
Glennon's party first visited the port of 
Archangel where they were able to view the long 
lines of ammunition trains that were waiting to 
move southward. They also learned that conditions 
in the fleet were bad, but there was no immediate 
danger of revolt. Moving on to Roggekuel on the 
Gulf of Riga the Americans were able to sail on a 
small destroyer whose crew proved to be both well-
trained and enthusiastic. Returning to shore the 
Glennon party got its first taste of the war when 
they were interrupted by a German air raid. Glennon 
"enjoyed himself hugely" giving various orders and 
37 leading his little band to cover. At Zerel the 
party got another positive view of the Baltic situ-
ation as enthusiastic sailors tossed Glennon in the 
-110-
air as per the local custom. The Admiral apparently 
enjoyed this event after a few nervous moments. 38 
After an exciting thirty knot sail on the modern 
destroyer Samson Glennon arrived in Helsingfors in 
time to witness a revolt by several battleships. As 
Admiral Derderevskii's yacht attempted to set sail 
for Reva! the battleships, under radical command, 
attempted to block the yacht. Luckily for Verder-
evskii several submarines that remained loyal to 
the Admiral interposed themselves and the ships 
withdrew. 39 
After this incident Admiral Glennon and Fedotof f-
White became involved in another incident which 
demonstrates some. of the problems that the Provi-
sional Government faced. After hearing of the brutal 
slaying of Admiral Nepenin, Glennon thoughtlessly 
remarked that it 11 had served him righ~' as the Russian 
Admiral 11 had no business to give up without a fight. 11 
Dmitri Fedotoff-White left the ·American Admiral's 
presence in a rage and only Commander Crosley's 
intervention persuaded him to return. After Glennon 
had made an apology Fedotoff-White explained that 
the officers were virtually powerless as the govern-
ment "didn't dare investigate or punish the murderers" 
and had little real power to back them up because of 
the strength of the Soviet. Whether Glennon accepted 
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this view is unknown but at least he was exposed to 
't 40 i • 
Thus both General Scott and Admiral Glennon had 
relatively broad overall views of the Russian mili-
tary situation. Although Scott could perhaps have 
seen more of the Russian army, it is doubtful that 
the Provisional Government would have wished to show 
him their worst divisions. Scott was well apprised 
of the military situation in general and Glennon•s 
experiences were exceptional. Both men's conclu-
sions seem realistic under the circumstances. 
Although General Scott seems to have evidenced 
greater doubt that Russia could launch a strong 
war effort, his advocacy of aid to Russian trans-
portation seems to have been the most realistic 
American policy available. Both men seem to have 
come off somewhat gruff but had profound, if tern-
porary, positive effects -- Scott in Roumania and 
Glennon at Sebastopol. Dr. Mott's effect appears 
to have been similar. The efforts of these three 
men should not be discounted due to the limitations 
placed upon them particularly by time and their 
areas of expertise. It is highly questionable 
whether these men could have had.any strong influence 
on the Soviet had they been given the opportunity, 
although they might have had more insight into the 
\ 
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situation facing the Russian people and their allies 
had they been able to visit that body. 
CHAPTER SIX 
THE NEW LIGHT 
OF THE WORLD 
-113-
In retrospect the most important subsection of 
the Root Mission was that of James Duncan and Charles 
Edward Russell. Given the political situation, the 
discrediting of Root, and political and diplomatic 
realities which precluded the special Ambassador 
from making an appearance before the Soviet, America's 
best chances to reach that body now rested on Duncan 
and Russell. Only they among Root Mission personnel 
had the potential to establish a working relation-
ship with the Soviet and adequately present the 
American viewpoint. 
James Duncan's style and socio-political back-
ground may have excluded him from the start. He 
received mixed reviews from those present. Dmitri 
Fedotoff-White's characterization was caustic in the 
extreme. White described Duncan as "stupid," 
"vulgar," and "practically devoid of manners. 11 
Further, White reports that some members of the 
American Commission "openly" ignored him. 1 In con-
trast, T. Bentley Mott described James Duncan as "an 
absolute joy" who was both very amusing and at age 
seventy-two still full of energy. 2 Duncan's manners 
were not of crucial importance to the success of his 
mission, and may in fact have been an asset in some 
circles. However, the union leader's naive approach 
to the Russian situation was unlikely to influence 
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the intellectual and idealistic theoreticians who 
led the all-Russian and Petrograd Soviets -- whether 
Marxist or not. Duncan's emphasis was primarily 
pragmatic and too closely tied to the American 
experience to move or inspire the members of those 
bodies. It is possible that Duncan could have suc-
ceeded had he used a more inspiring approach. 
Duncan apparently enjoyed his train ride from 
Vladivostok to Petrograd where he was able to make 
several speeches and numerous observations. In-
cluded among the letters was one in which he described 
the Manchurians as "more indolent than the Mongoli-
ans," which he may have attributed to his basic 
premise that "where·returns or wages for labor per-
formed are meagre, ambition to earn is not keenly 
in evidence." Perhaps the high point of the overland 
ride for Duncan was his cribbage victory over Judson. 
Duncan revealed his attitude on this occasion when 
he described his success as a victory of the "indus-
trialists over the military. 113 
Duncan spent most of his time in Petrograd meet-
ing with the Minister of Labor, Matthew I, Skobelev 
and touring the factory districts in the Petrograd 
area. He quickly realized the danger that the atti-
tude of the workers posed to the war effort. Duncan's 
clasic example of this problem was the actions of 
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the munitions workers who charged their employers 
for two hour discussions of politics. 5 He hoped 
to improve Russian business-labor relations by 
introducing the Russian workers to the collective 
bargaining approach of the American Federation of 
Labor. He conveyed this idea principally through 
his talks with Skobelev and his speech to the 
All-Russian Soviet. He also advocated a shift 
system that would increase Russian labor's output 
and a quick settlement to labor problems in mining 
and munitions. In addition to these efforts Duncan 
met on several occasions with British Labor Party 
member, Arthur Henderson. During these meetings 
the two labor leaders discussed the war effort, the 
Stockholm Conference, and labor problems in general. 6 
Duncan's visit to the All- Russian Soviet in late 
June influenced his whole perception of the Russian 
situation. While he watched, the Soviet voted on 
a motion to deport a certain Robert Grirrm who was 
allegedly a German spy. The Provisional Government 
had already decided to deport Grimm, and the Soviet's 
vote thus constituted a vote of confidence. This 
vote was overwhelmingly in support of the government, 
640 to 148. Duncam concluded that the Provisional 
Government enjoyed substantial support within the 
Soviet. The comfortable margin that the government 
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received "practically governed the session thereafter 
when important divisions affecting the status of the 
Government were taken up. 117 Duncan was undoubtedly 
naive in assuming that a single vote adequately 
demonstrated the Soviet's support of the Provisional 
Government. He does not appear to have suspected that 
the Soviet had become the real power center in Russia. 
On June 29, 1917 the leader of the Granite 
cutter's Association was given an opportunity to reach 
the heart of revolutionary Russia. He did not. In his 
usual mundane fashion he described American labor 
practices, encouraged support for the "war to end all 
wars", and advocated a law prohibiting child labor. 
At one point Duncan·argued that although soldiers 
couldn't fight in shifts, the workers could work in 
shifts to support their comrades. This approach was 
a good one and quite naturally brought applause from 
the soldiers' delegates who saw "the pith of the 
argument." The American labor leader did not elaborate 
on how the workers' delegates received the idea. In 
any event Duncan concluded that his address had been 
"well received" and that Soviet Chairman Tscheidze 
8 had made an "able reply." 
on July 27 Duncan attended the All-Russian Con-
gress of Cossacks with Dr. Mott. The Cossacks 
constituted a relatively conservative force in Russian 
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politics. Nevertheless they had generally supported 
the March Revolution. By early July they were grow-
ing increasingly hostile to Bolshevik propaganda and 
had become a major bulwark for the Provisional Govern-
ment. The Congress offered Duncan a more receptive 
audience than the Soviet had been, but he apparently 
failed to influence them in a major way and instead 
concentrated on his major theme of increasing work in 
the factories. The Cossacks were, of course, largely 
nomadic and had little interest in factory work. 9 
During late June and early July Duncan visited 
various other organizations, particularly the Petro-
grad Soviet, and made further visits to the workers 
who were responsible for the output of war material. 
From his report it appears that the American labor 
leader spent most of his time passing out American 
propaganda and giving speeches in which he advocated 
increased work in the factories, support for the war, 
adoption of the practices of American labor unions, 
and adoption of union labels. 10 In his last major 
address, to the All-Russian Trade Union in Petrograd 
on July 5, Duncan once again struck these same tired 
notes, expousing American methods of union organiza-
tion and settling "trade contentions. 1111 There is no 
record of how Duncan was received but this may well 
have been the proper audience for his ideas. In 
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general, however, his pragmatic approach to the 
advancement of "working men", which could have been 
highly useful in other times, was not well suited to 
a revolutionary era. Perhaps typical of the situa-
tion was the attitude of R. J. Ischudetzki; a labor 
leader who had arranged for Duncan's visits to the 
various war-related industries in and around Petro-
grad. Ischudetzki's position on the war was that he 
wished to end it "promptly and successfully so that 
there might be opportunity to depose and dethrone 
capitalism. 1112 
It is doubtful that James Duncan made any last-
ing impression on either the Russian workers or their 
representatives. He seems to have been satisfied 
that one of his principle goals of increasing the 
output of Russian workers through an adoption of the 
shift system eventually gained Labor Minister 
Skobelev's support. Duncan reports that he was later 
informed that "the agitation along this line was 
satisfactory to the workers, providing suitable 
compensation was assured them." Duncan concluded 
that the Mission's visit had been a timely one; the 
Russian situation had on the whole been greatly 
improved and "excellent general results" were in 
.d 13 ev1 ence. 
It is easy to view Duncan as having been blind 
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to the meaning of the events that passed before his· 
eyes. Obviously his advocacy 6~ the adoption of 
child labor laws and the use of union lables seems 
preposterous in light of the questions of life and 
death that were facing his audience. The disturb~ng 
fact is that there must have been some reason for 
Duncan to take such an optimistic view of the situa-
tion in his official report. Certainly the vote in 
the All-Russian Soviet that sustained the Provisional 
Government was important, as were perhaps the others 
to which Duncan alludes. 
It is unlikely th.at his positive conclusions 
were based upon some unrevealed facts. He may simply 
have suppressed his real fears both in the official 
reports and his public statements. Most likely, he 
failed entirely to understand what he was observing. 
There can, however, be little doubt that Duncan did 
not have the personality, prestige, or perspective to 
significantly influence those Russians with whom he 
. t t 14 came in con ac • 
Charles Edward Russell was potentially the most 
important member of the Root Mission. As an avowed 
socialist, rather than a trade unionist, Russell had 
a more concrete philosophical link with the Soviet's 
leaders. Although it is claimed that he had not read 
all of Karl Marx's Das Kapital he had at least read 
f "t 15 some o 1 • 
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More important perhaps were his intel-
lectual facilities, which undoubtedly outshown Duncan's 
and his reputation as a "muckraker" and socialist 
candidate for Governor of New York. Counter-balancing 
these aspects of his background was his expulsion from 
the pro-German Socialist Party of America, the 
negative comments of Maxim Gorky's The New Life, and 
an article published in Prahvda by Trorsky which con-
tended that Russell was a "secret member" of J. P. 
16 Morgan and Company. Most probably realizing that 
Russell did indeed have a chance of communicating 
successfully with both the Russian Social Revolution-
aries and Social Democrats, anti-war forces concen-
trated their efforts in discrediting him. That they 
and some genuinely unconvinced Russians were success-
ful in casting Russell in a bad light is highly prob-
able, Whether Russell could or should have been able 
to overcome this sabotage is worthy of examination. 
In making this examination it is perhaps crucial to 
recognize that few Russians had knowledge of Russell 
personally. Reports of his expulsion from the Ameri-
can socialist Party, recounted in Gorky's paper and 
perhaps others, must have some him significant, per-
haps irrepairable, damage in the absence of common 
knowledge of his genuine humanitarianism. This is 
another example of the harmful effects of both 
- 1 2 1 -
g e n e r a l  R u s s i a n  i g n o r a n c e  a n d  t h e  ab~ence o f  a n  
e f f e c t i v e  o u t l e t  f o r  t h e  A m e r i c a n  v i e w p o i n t .  
D m i t r i  F e d o t o f f - W h i t e ' s  i m p r e s s i o n  o f  C h a r l e s  
E d w a r d  R u s s e l l  w a s  s o m e w h a t  c r i t i c a l .  H e  f o u n d  
R u s s e l l  a  m a n  o f  s e t  a n d  " r a t h e r  m o d e r a t e  v i e w s "  w h o  
c o n s i d e r e d  h i m s e l f  a  s o c i a l i s t  t h e o r e t i c i a n .  F u r t h e r ,  
R u s s e l l  k e p t  t h e  c o m p a n y  o f  " s e v e r a l  l o n g - h a i r e d  
i n d i v i d u a l s "  w h o  " l e d  h i m  b y  t h e  n o s e "  a n d  " f i l l e d  
h i s  h e a d  w i t h  a l l  k i n d s  o f  n o n s e n s e .
1 1 1 7  
o n e  i s  l e f t  
w i t h  t h e  i m p r e s s i o n  o f  a  s o m e w h a t  s u p e r f i c i a l  s o c i a l i s t  
w h o  w a s  e a s i l y  s w a y e d .  T h e  i d e n t i t y  o f  t h e  " l o n g -
h a i r e d  i n d i v i d u a l s "  i s  u n k n o w n .
1 8  
U n l i k e  m o s t  o f  h i s  c o m p a t r i o t s  C h a r l e s  R u s s e l l  
s e e m s  t o  h a v e  a v o i d e d  m a n y  o f  t h e  e a r l y  c e r e m o n i e s  a n d  
t o  h a v e  b e g u n  t h e  w o r k  o f  o r g a n i z i n g  t h e  p u b l i c i t y  
c a m p a i g n .  H e  w o r k e d  o n  t h i s  w i t h  t h e  a i d  o f  S t a n l e y  
W a s h b u r n  f r o m  J u n e  1 3  u n t i l  J u n e  1 8 .  O n  t h e  l a t t e r  
d a t e  R u s s e l l  a n d  D u n c a n  a g a i n  a p p e a l e d  t o  t h e  o t h e r  
m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  M i s s i o n  t o  b e g i n  a  p r o p a g a n d a  c a m p a i g n  
o f  m a s s i v e  p r o p o r t i o n s .  R u s s e l l  characterize~ t h e  
f e e l i n g  o f  t h e  R o o t  p a r t y  a s  o n e  o f  " g r e a t  d e p r e s s i o n "  
o n  t h i s  d a y .  A t  t h i s  p o i n t  h e  a s k e d  t o  b e  r e l i e v e d  
o f  h i s  p u b l i c i t y  w o r k ;  a p p a r e n t l y  f e e l i n g  t h a t  i t  w a s  
t o o  i n s i g n i f i c a n t  u n d e r  t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s .
1 9  
D u r i n g  t h e  r e m a i n d e r  o f  h i s  s t a y  i n  R u s s i a ,  
R u s s e l l  s p e n t  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  h i s  t i m e  m e e t i n g  w i t h  
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the leaders of the Soviet and the editor~ of various 
radical newspapers. On June 19 he met with the three 
most influential non-Bolshevik socialists~ Labor 
Minister Skoboleff, the President of the Soviet, 
Irakly G. Tseretelli and Social Revolutionary leader, 
Victor Chernov. Although Russell made no specific 
report of this meeting it seems likely that he was 
able to get a reasonably good view of the majority 
socialist viewpoints. When the main body of the Root 
Mission went to Moscow, Russell remained in Petro-
grad to talk with Soviet leaders. By June 22 he cabled 
the State Department saying that his work could 
not be completed in the time alloted and asked 
20 for permission to extend his stay. 
While he was awaiting a reply from the State 
Department. Charles Russell was given an opportunity 
to address the All-Russian Soviet. 21 Clearly aware 
of the criticism that had been leveled at him, he 
began his speech y demonstrating his socialist 
credentials: 
"I hold in one hand the red card of the 
Socialist Party of the United States and 
in the other the card of the printers' 
trade union, ... of which I am a member. 
I came therefore from the plain people 
of America, from the workers, the radi-
cals, the American revolution, the champ-
ions of democracy." 
After praising the Russian revolution, the effects of 
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which he described as "if in the darkest night a new 
planet had suddenly arisen greater than the sun.", 
the American socialist went on to describe America's 
peaceloving nature. Like most other speeches delivered 
by members of the Root Mission, Russell's soon turned 
to his main issue: "Today the American radicals, 
workers, and democrats have united ferevently to sup-
port and uphold this dreadful thing they had always 
abhorred." The war was one to save democracy, with-
out which "there can never come socialism, never come 
peace, never come the emancipation of man." Further 
II 
• we can never right the ancient wrongs of labor, 
never gain for the producer the just fruits of his 
toil, never free meri's hearts and lives from the 
frightful blight and cold horrors of the competitive 
system" without democracy. 22 This was perhaps the 
best speech made by any member of the Root Mission. 
Russell clearly understood his audience as well as 
any American can have been expected to. He picked 
the best and only angle that he could have wisely used 
to bring the members of the Soviet to the American 
viewpoint. 
It is clear that Charles Edward Russell under-
stood the intricacies of the Russian situation in much 
greater depth than the other members of the Root 
Mission. In a series of articles published in various 
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popula American magazines soon after his return to 
the United States, and eventually summarized in his 
book, Unchained Russia, Russell concluded that the 
decision of whether to continue the war lay with "the 
toilers." It was the Soviet, not the Provisional 
Government, that controlled Russia's fate. 23 Further 
a whole new attitude now prevailed in the land. 24 
Russell criticized the "general failure of the Western 
mind to grasp the sacredness of the Revolution. 1125 
The "Allies never grasped the primary fact of the 
situation • • • ,"that it was the voice of the 
proletariat and the proletariat alone that was 
26 heeded." "Bµt so strong are the fixed habits of 
men's minds that Russia must be like the government of 
other countries. 1127 It was clear to Russell that the 
Allies had th:Jught that the Russian Revolution aimed 
only for political democracy, "But the Russian 
Revolutionists had shot far beyond political democracy; 
they aimed at industrial democracy no less. 1128 
What Russell feared was that the Russian worker 
would never realize Germany's antipathy to democracy 
h 1 . . 1 . d t . 1 29 in either t e po 1t1ca or in us ria sense. This 
fear was based on both the Allies' general misunder-
standing of the nature of the revolution and the 
presence of numerous "German" agents who "swarmed" 
around the All-Russian Soviet, encouraging its leaders 
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to thlnk that that body was the "r:cw 119ht o! tho 
world" while tryinQ. w1th s~c succc:rn. to conv1nco 
the Russians that the United States wos tho enemy o! 
30 the Revolution. Ruoocll was oallcd by the !act that 
the Gerr:1ans hod "overwhelmed the 1,111ea on a f 1old 
never wisely nor cf!1c1cntly contcoted. 031 Further, 
the American press was havinQ the c!!cct of a1d1nQ 
the Germans 1n their qoals by 1to oarcost1c ort1clcn 
about the Bolshev1ks or.d other "1gnorant" Runs1ans. 
even if these stor1eo were o~unlnQ lo ,\r.;cr1can 
audiences. For Charles Rusocll "there won vary little 
fun in stanchn9 on t.hc r 1cld o! H.:Jrn or.d hc:ir 1no 
• " thoze ort.lclc:i ·· read to a cro~d o! 
32 id1gnant Russ1ans.R Chorlco Ruaucll'u v1cw o! thla 
unfortunate s1tunt1on v<in shared by So~ucl tt.'irpcr. 
1\s early as late April o! 1917: Pro!cnnor ll:sq:<tr had 
began a ca~pa19n to have -oll rc!crcnccs to Runnion 
wcaknes5 and 1nc!fcct1\.0 cr.crrn '~xchal•·d !r~ the proan." 
Dcsp1 te so~e nuccc:w. hovcvcr. the nhort-:Uqhtcd 
A.~erican attac~s were ap~arcntly nt1ll bo1r.Q road at 
ll the Soviet 1n July. 
V1trually alone ar.d probably larqcly d1ncrcd1tcd. 
chaclcs Russell ~ust h3~c !clt 1~cr.r.c !runtrat1on. 
on June 30. Lans1r.g v1rcd ;~bassndor franc15 to notify 
hl~ that ~usscll could cxtcr.d his ntoy 1n Runnla. The 
;"'~crican soc1al1st nc•:cr received thus tcl~ra::l. 
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Ambassador Francis, perhaps unaware of Russell's 
request, wired the Secretary of State at once asking 
f 1 . f. t. 34 . h . or c ari ica ion. Later in t e say Francis sent 
another cable noting that Russell was "in through 
touch with" the Soviet and was "maintaining that they 
have the power." Francis reported that this belief 
had led Russell to talk about the Provisional Govern-
ment "disrespectfully and openly, consequently, if 
he remains in any capacity he might make trouble." 
Francis concluded that Russell had decided that his 
request was not to be answered and had therefore 
decided to return with Root. 35 Thus the matter ended 
with Francis withholding the cable, although Polk 
36 
wired Francis on July 7, ordering Russell's return. 
After failing in his attempt to remain in Russia, 
Charles Russell joined his fellow ambassadors on the 
return trip. It was clear in his mind that two 
things must be done in order to save the Russian 
situation for the Allies. One was that a massive 
propaganda campaign must be launched by the United 
States and the other was that it must be impressed 
on American newspaper editors that articles critical 
of the Soviet and the Russians in general were having 
a disasterous impact on the Russian view of America. 
Russell would take up this two-fold mission upon his 
37 
return. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE CAREFUL ATTENTION 
OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT 
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While Dr. Mott, Scott, and Glennon were travel-
ing and Russell and Duncan weie trying to gain 
influence with the Soviet, Ambassador Root and the 
other members of the Mission were attending conferences, 
dinners, and entertaining or being entertained by 
various Russians and Allies and Americans in Petgrograd. 
f\mbassador Root remained in Petrograd throughout except 
for a short trip to Moscow which, while it may or may 
not have enlightened the mission members, does provide 
some interesting insights into the Russian mind of 1917. 
On June 21, Ambassador Root and the main body of 
the mission, including Bertron, McCormick, Duncan, 
3eneral Scott, T. Bentley Mott, Colonel Judson, and 
various aids left Petrograd for Moscow by train. Prior 
to their departure Basil Miles had wired American 
:ounsel Madden Summers that the mission, while in 
~oscow, wanted no banquets or entertainment that would 
be "inconsistent with the present condition of short 
food supply." Miles requested that Sununers find 
opportunities for "arousing some enthusiasm. 111 On 
June 22 the American were officially welcomed by the 
Moscow Duma. After speeches by Mayor Astrov and several 
leaders of Russian and American commercial organizations, 
Root spoke. Again he emphasized that the Americans 
had come to aid Russia and that Germany was their 
corrunon foe. 2 
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Although Root is reported to have received loud 
applause the response of several Moscovites who were 
present is significant. Were the Americans really 
going to aid Russia in her time of need? N. M. Kishkin, 
Commissare of Moscow, voiced this question when he 
stated that he had "always considered that the Amer-
icans • • were realists • • • we are sure that at the 
present time the Mission has come with a real offer 
for which we are deeply thankful. 113 The leader of the 
Moscow Soviet, Tretiakov, pointed out that many Russian 
"classes had not expected help from America in the war" 
and emphasized that because of this it was imperative 
that Russia derive a real benefit from the arrival of 
th Am . 4 e ericans. 
After the meeting Root spoke with reporters. Con-
trary to his actual beliefs he emphasized that he was 
not in the least bit alarmed by the Russian situation 
and that he expected the war to end by 1918. The 
reporter seemed more interested that the American 
soldiers followed orders out of a sense of duty in 
absence of an "elective principle. 115 
That night the Root party slept on their train 
which was withdrawn from Moscow to Chimky, several 
miles away, undoubtedly for safety reasons. Throughout 
the rest of their stay in Moscow the Root party attended 
meetings and Root spoke to numerous groups. Most of 
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these events were of minor significance except for 
Root's meeting with the High Procurator of the Holy 
Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, Vladimir Lvov. 
This meeting is of great significance not only because 
it is one of the few that was well reported, but be-
cause Ambassador Root appears to have given substantial 
weight to Lvov's observations on the Russian political 
situation. Further, Lvov's views were probably similar 
to those held by leading members of the government and 
many moderate socialists. They are also important 
because they are the only views of a Russian high offi-
cial that can be documented in an American source. 6 
The meeting was held at the National Hotel. 
Ambassador Root began the coversation by inquiring as 
to what Lvov thought of the proposed Constituent Assem-
bly. Lvov replied that he disagreed with the govern-
ment's timing; for he felt that the Assembly should not 
be elected prior to the end of the war. Lvov believed 
that a constituent assembly could be safely convened 
only after peace was achieved and Russia's "vital forces," 
i.e., the pro-law and order moderate majority of the 
socialist parties, had time to come into play. Further, 
Lvov feared that if an assembly was elected prior to an 
end of the fighting it would exhibit ... dangerously maxi-
malistic tendencies." Lvov went on to appraise the 
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current situation. He said an evergrowing gap between 
the Maximalists (Bolsheviks) and the moderate majority 
of socialists (the Social Revolutionaires and most 
Mensheviks) existed and that if a "clear break" occurred 
between the Bolsheviks and the Provisional Government 
he felt that the moderate Socialists would support the 
government. 
At this point in the conversation Root expressed 
his fear that the Bolsheviks, waving the "black flag" 
of a separate peace would revolt and gain control of 
the country. Lvov cited the large pro-government vote 
in the Petrograd Soviet of March 14 (on a radical mo-
tion to arrest the Provisional Government) and contended 
that the new coalition cabinet had the situation in 
hand. Nevertheless, Lvov stated that he expected that 
the Bolsheviks could revolt at any time and probably 
in the very near future. Lvov felt that the moderates 
would win out, although much bloodshed was likely. The 
moderate socialists understood that now was not the 
time for many of the major socialistic innovations or 
an abandonment of the private property system. Root 
voiced the primary American concern of whether the army 
would be able to advance in the near future. Lvov 
replied that this was impossible until the Bolsheviks 
were defeated and their propaganda silenced. 7 
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Much of Lvov's analysis seems correct. Although 
the March 14 vote was somewhat.outdated it is clear 
that the majority of Russian socialists were not 
prepared to go forward with Bolshevik proposals. 8 
That Lvov knew or believed that the Bolsheviks would 
revolt in the near future is significant. Root 
accepted this view and it appears that the Provisional 
Government expected it. 9 The political situation in 
Russia had in fact changed radically since the Root 
Mission had arrived. The majority of the Murshevik 
and Social Revolutionary parties were, by late May 
or early June, committed to the Provisional Govern-
ment. In mid-June the Bolsheviks had won a decisive 
moral victory in a contest of banners among the 
workers of Petrograd. This had caused much concern 
in moderate and conservative circles and the Root 
Mission must have been aware of it to some degree. 10 
Judging from several of Ambassador Root's subsequent 
observations, he appears to have accepted Lvov's 
viewpoint that the Bolsheviks would be unable to gain 
control of the country at that time. 
on June 24 the Root Part, now including Crane 
and Dr. Mott, returned to Petrograd, arriving the 
next day. From here Root and General Scott went to 
Russian general staff headquarters (Stafka) at Mogilev 
to meet with General Brusiloff. After Brusilou 
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apprised them of the military situation, Scott 
left for the front and Roumania while Root returned 
to Petrograd. 11 After their visits to Moscow and 
Stafka the main body of the Root Mission resumed 
schedules similar to those they had had prior to their 
departure. On June 28 the Mission held a general con-
f erence to discuss what was learned at Stafka. On 
Sunday, July 1, Root joined Tereschenko at his dacha in 
Finland. The majority of the Mission's members attended 
special services at the Kazan Cathedral held in memory 
1 . 
of those who had died in the March Revolution. 2 
Ambassador Root returned on Monday and again 
took up the propaganda campaign. Since his original 
cable of June 17, (see supra, p. 82-3.), the Mission had 
received only a brief cable from Washington stating 
that the proposal and short-term funding were being 
given "careful consideration. 1113 Obviously con-
cerned, Root, with the aid of Mccormick and Bertron 
had put up $30,000 of their own money to begin the 
campaign. This initial expense included the publish-
ing and mass distribution of two of President Wilson's 
speeches and one of Ambassador Root's and was carried 
14 
out through the British and French. Now, two weeks 
after his original cable on the issue, Root again 
cabled Lansing: "I beg you to realize that Germany 
is now attacking Russia by propaganda and is spending 
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millions, at least a million dollars monthly, to 
capture the minds of the Russian people." He 
stressed the urgent need for "active and immediate 
counter-attacks by the same weapons" and noted the 
Mission's $30,000 expenditure. 15 Charles Russell 
reported that Root himself had often been the victim 
of such propaganda, not necessarily German, and was 
"violently" attacked at the Field of Mars where the 
All-Russian Soviet met. Russell stated that he 
feared for the Ambassador's life. 16 
Later in the day news of the successful advance 
of General Brusilov was received from the front. 
It inspired several popular demonstrations and the 
Soviet passed a strong "pro-war, civic duty" resolu-
tion supported by all but a "very few Maximalists and 
. . 1 . t 111 7 . h . h 1 th internationa is s. T is was, owever, a so e 
day when the All-Russian Soviet sponsored massive 
demonstrations in Petrograd. Confident of a victory 
the moderate majority of the Soviet had supported the 
idea which was originally a Bolshevik plan. In what 
turned out to be a contest of banners, the Bolsheviks 
won an astounding moral victory. There is no clear-
cut evidence that the Root Mission was aware of 
this occurence or its implications on July 1. It 
may, however, serve to explain the urgency of Ambas-
1 h . t 18 sador ~cot's cab e to Was ing on. 
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From July 5 through the seventh Root was 
occupied with the Conference of Allied Ambassadors 
thenk taking place in Petrograd. This Conference met 
at the British Embassy and was chaired by Arthur 
Henderson. Its purpose was to determine how best to 
aid Russia. The conference report, adopted July 7, 
suggested that Russia needed 2,000 locomotives and 
40,000 railway cars, of which the United States could 
send about half. The report also advised adoption of 
the shift system, expansion of repair shops, and 
creation of price commissions and arbitration boards. 
It offered American skilled labor, and instructed the 
Russians to "avoid reckless driving." In addition a 
Joint Allied Committee would be set up on a semi-
permenant basis in Petrograd for the purpose of aid-
. . 19 ing Russia. 
After the Allied Ambassador's Conference Root 
addressed a group of wounded soldiers on July 8 and 
learned from Tereschenko that the Provisional Govern-
ment would be unable to meet the military payrolls 
20 due on July 15. This impending crisis could have 
had disasterous consequences, fanning the dissention 
of the Army and Navy into armed opposition to the 
Government. Root immediately telegraphed Lansing to 
request $75,000,000 in credits. This request was 
granted without delay, but no mention was made of the 
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21 $100,000 grant for propaganda. 
By this time the Mission was ready to implement 
its propaganda plans. Charles Smith of the Associated 
Press had arrived from Peking to conduct the campaign. 22 
Although the plan was under consideration in Washington, 
approval was not forthcoming. 23 On July 7 Root had 
received Washington's reply to his second request for 
money to begin a publicity campaign. The Mission was 
informed that the President approved of the campaign 
"in principle" and would authorize the $30,000 
expense already incurred. The question of further 
outlay was "receiving the careful attention of the 
24 Department." The American envoys became discouraged. 
T. Bentley Mott later stated that the "request for an 
allotment with which to begin operations was so 
modest" that the envoys had no idea "that it would be 
refused." Actually, as Colonel Mott pointed out, the 
t f d 't . 1 . d 25 request was no re use , i was simp y ignore • A 
disgusted Root ordered Mott to make arrangements for 
the Mission's return. He told Mott: "I want you to 
get this expedition started back as quickly as pos-
sible. We receive no replies to our telegrams and 
our staying here under such conditions is useless. 
Perhaps by going to Washington in person we can get 
. ..26 
some action. 
A$ the Root Mission prepared to depart, the 
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persistent rumors of a major Bolshevik uprising 
continuea. 27 Charles Russell reported that at one 
point it was suggested that the Root Mission with-
draw to Helsingfors, as it was rumored that the 
Bolsheviks planned to attack the Winter Palace and 
"wipe out" the Americans. 28 Nevertheless the 
American ambassadors seem to have accepted the 
assurances of Procurator Lvov, Kerensky, and others, 
that the revolt would be successfully suppressed 
and the leaders of the Bolsheviks imprisoned. 29 
Root cabled his appraisal of the situation to Lansing 
on July 10: 
We feel that we have contributed materially 
to strengtheni~g the Provisional Government 
and improving morale of people and army. 
The situation is certainly much more hope- 30 ful and stable than it was when we arrived. 
Root's analysis of the work of the Mission was 
not only wishful but largely inaccurate. There can 
be little doubt that the speeches of several members 
of the Root Mission had been temporarily useful to 
the Provisional Government. It is improbable that 
any of these speeches had a lasting impact. The 
Mission had clearly, but understandably, failed to 
influence the great mass of the Russian people. This 
could only have been done through a large scale 
publicity apparatus. 
That the Russian situation was "much more hope-
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ful and stable" was clearly open to question. in 
fact the Provisional Government and their tenuous 
allies, the moderate majority faction of the Soviet, 
had recently suffered a def eat by the Bolsheviks in 
a contest for popular support in Petrograd. The 
Galicia offensive did appear successful on July 10 
but the internal situation must be seen to have 
worsened since mid-June. In any realistic analysis 
the outcome of the expected Bolshevik uprising would 
be the determining factor. Since this had yet to 
occur Root's analysis must be considered as premature. 31 
The Root Mission decided not to await the pre-
dieted uprising and boarded their train for 
Vladivostok later on the tenth. The return trip 
across Siberia was made by all the major original 
members of the Mission except Crane and Judson. 
Colonel Judson was appointed Military Attache in 
Petrograd where he remained until his recall in 
December, 1917. 32 Charles Crain remained in Russia 
until September. 
The only major incident of the return trip 
occured on July 11 when the American stopped at 
Viatka where they learned that a wooden bridge over 
which they must cross had been burned. The following 
day, while the Mission waited for the tracks to be 
switch~d to a new stone and steel bridge nearby, an 
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icehouse near their train was set on fire and flames 
spread to several frei9ht cars. Both inc1dcnts wore 
presumed to have been the work of the Dolnhcv1ka. 33 
The train finally pulled out of V1atka on July 12 
after a delay of thrity hours. Tho rcma1ndcr of the 
journey to Vladivostok was peaceful. The train stopped 
on two occasions for tho members to 90 awir:-r.itno and 
Root made two speeches both of wh1ch were reportedly 
well received. On July 21 the Root Miosion arrived in 
Vladivostok and Cr:lbarkcd for 1\rncr1ca that afternoon 
at 2:41 p.m. Prior to his departure. A.~bassador Root 
left the l\lncrican Connul at Vlad1vo5tok. John K. 
Caldwell. a letter for Frank B1ll1n~a of the arr1vino 
Red Cross Co::-.:nission. Thls letter providen and 
excellent and more realistic stat~cnt of Root's 
conclusions about Rusnla. After polnt1no out that tho 
of aid was predicated on whether Rusn1a would be able 
to continue the war. Root added that: 
We arc sat1sf 1cd that practically no one 
really connected v1th the qovcrr..~ent. 
either directly in the departr.:cnts or 
1r.d1rcctly ln tho r.~jor1ty of the council 
of te Wor;:.en's and Soldier's Deputies. 
has any intention of r...aY.1n9 a separate 
peace. 
Root bcl1cvcd the cruc1al qucst1or: was whether the 
Provisional Govern~cnt had the povcr to contlno 
the war. The f trnt "serious tent .. would co~c dur.i.nQ 
the w1ntcr wh~n tho probl<?:':l of hav1n9 onou9h food. 
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both at the front and in the cities, would come to 
the fore. If this problem could not be met effectively, 
Root predicted "mob violence" and the overthrow of 
the Provisional Government. Root concluded that 
general problems with transportation and labor, 
especially the "great lack of discipline among the 
railroad employees", made improvement "very difficult". 
He advised Billings to take over the care of the 
refugees from occupied Russia and Poland so that 
the Provisional Government could concentrate on 
supplying the army. 34 This letter to Billings 
demonstrates that Root had a reasonable understand-
ing of the Russian situation and that behind his 
public optimism lay serious doubts about the 
Provisional Government's ability to survive. 
As the Root Mission left Russia in late July 
the predicted "Bolshevik" revolt took place. Like 
many of the events of the Russian revolutions of 
1917, it was largely spontaneous and leaderless. 
The uprising was eventually turned into a victory 
for the moderates and conservatives. These forces 
would dominate until mid-September. 35 It is not 
know exactly when the Root Mission's members 
learned of the outcome which appeared to corresponc 
to Procurator Lvov's predictions. in actual fact 
the "vi~tory" of the non-Bolshevik elements was 
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turbulent and short-lived because the basic 
problems of land distribution and war aims remained 
unresolved. The Root Mission in all probability 
arrived in Washington believing that Lvov and those 
h t d h . . . t t 36 w o supper e is viewpoin were correc • 
The return voyage was made in fourteen days. On 
July 26 the Buffalo ran into a "brisk nor 1 wester 11 
which caused the vessel to go through "certain 
complicated gyrations, which proved to be incompatible 
with the gastric safety of a number of the passengers." 
Dr. Holten Curl lectured oti his expetience on the 
Russian front and Stanely Washburn spoke on "Russia's 
contribution to the cause of the Allies." The Buffalo 
37 docked at Seattle on August 3. 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
INDECISION AT THE WHITE HOUSE 
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The Root Mission disembarked at Seattle on 
~ugust 4 and, after a brief reception, Root, Russell, 
Duncan and General Scott spoke, generally emphasiz-
ing that democracy and the Provisional Government 
ld . . . 1 wou survive in Russia. After a short stop in 
Chicago the envoys arrived in Washington on August 8 
where they were met by State Department counselor 
~rank Polk and Samuel Gompers. At a Washington press 
conference Ambassador Root again emphasized Russia's 
strengths and the democratic traditions of many of 
the cities, towns and Zemstvo unions. Major Washburn 
1dmitted that the military situation was discourag-
ing; the Russians having begun to fall back from 
:;eneral Brusilov' s J·uly offensive, but contended 
that the Russians would get stronger and the Germans 
weaker if the battle lines approached Petrograd and 
~oscow. General Scott was optimistic, noting that 
1fter an "orgy of liberty" the Russians were settling 
jown. The Mission's members presented a united front 
of praise of Russia, optimism, and assurance that no 
separate peace could be made while the Provisional 
Government remained in power. Only Charles Edward 
Russell openly disagreed with his colleagues on any 
issues. Russell, while basically supporting the 
general outlook of the other members, contended that 
America should send troops to the Russian front and 
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continued to assert that the 11 workman 1 s council" was 
2 the real government of Russia. The other members of 
the American Mission remained silent on the latter 
question but issued a general statement disagreeing 
with sending troops. The majority contended that 
transporting a small number of troops there would be 
of no moral or military account and when the Russians 
saw ~hat American troops received higher pay and 
better rations the reverse might occur. 3 
The question of whether or not to undertake a 
full scale propaganda campaign in Russia continued 
to be a source of conflict. Naturally the subject 
did not become a public issue but it was the major 
thrust of the Root Mission's suggested Russian 
strategy. Ambassador Root was, as demonstrated above, 
undoubtedly concerned. His sense of urgency is 
revealed by the fact that he cabled Lansing from 
Chicago on August 6 requesting an immediate meeting 
with the President which was granted. Colonel T. 
Bentley Mott described the meeting: "everybody was 
struck by the questions the President asked. He seemed 
very well informed ••• 11 on the Russian situation, 
11 intelligent and charming. 11 But he said not a word 
as to the Corrunission•s plan or why he had never 
answered those telegrams. 11 Mott does not record 
whether\anyone asked the President about either topic, 
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but if his account is correct it seems unlikely that 
anyone did. 4 That the Root Mission's foremost pro-
ject was not even discussed seems incredible. 
Unfortunately there are no other in-depth reports of 
this meeting. It is possible that the members of the 
American Commission believed that they would soon 
have another opportunity to discuss the matter with 
the President at length. This was not to be the case. 
After their meeting with the President the Root 
Mission had a "long conference" with Lansing followed 
by a more lengthly discussion between Root and the 
Secretary of State. Lansing recorded these meetings 
in memo. The Secretary of State noted that he was 
"astounded at their optimism" and stated that he felt 
that the Russian Revolution would follow the basic 
path of the French Revolution, i.e. moderation followed 
by terror culminating in a revolt against the terror 
and some type of military despotism. Lansing con-
cluded that while there was still a chance that the 
Provisional Government and its allies would survive, 
the United Stated should "strengthen" Russia "morally 
and materially" but be prepared for her ultimate with-
5 drawal from the war. 
During their meeting of August 8, the President 
requested a full report be sent to him when ready. 
On Augu~t 21, Dr. Mott forwarded the report of the Root 
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Mission, a supplemental report including the pro-
posed propaganda campaign, his own ideas on the 
uses of Y.M.C.A. stations in Russia, and several 
individual reports by members of the Commission. 6 
The main report covered various topics and 
provides a general summary of the conclusions of 
the Root Mission. The Report's chief contentions 
were that Russia's greatest problem was one of 
transportation; merchant ships were scarce and land 
transportation was "defective." The railroads in 
particular, were crippled by "defective organization" 
and by obsolete and worn-out rolling stock. The 
Report reiterated Root's note to Billings; the 
Provisional Government would not make a separate 
peace if it had "the power to continue the war." 
This power was predicated on popular support and 
the functioning of the "industrial system." The 
Government must also solve the problems of war 
weariness, increasing industrial inefficiency (which 
the Mission rated at one half of normal output), 
increased production costs, and the fact that many 
peasants were holding back their crops due to the 
decrease in the value of the ruble. 
The Root Mission's report was very clear in 
noting that the Petrograd Soviet had originally 
held "a greater power to exercise force" during the 
,-
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first months after the March Revolution than did the 
Provisional Government. Upon the election of the 
All-Russian Soviet the r~lationship between the 
Soviet and the Government was more cooperative because 
the former was more conservative and responsible than 
its predecessor. The Report pointed out that the 
Provisional Government's policy of separating the 
"Maximalists" or "Bolsheviks" from the moderate 
majority was working and that the Provisional Govern-
ment now had the power to enforce its decrees. 
The Report concluded that substantial economic 
aid from the Allies would create "a strong probability 
of keeping Russia in the war." Without such aid 
there was "little prospect" of so doing. The benefits 
of such aid would be "enormous" even if they allowed 
Russia only to "maintain its defensive" and thereby 
force the Central powers "to maintain continuously a 
large force upon their eastern front." The report 
was signed by all but Charles R. Crane, who was still 
in Russia. 8 
In its supplemental report the Root Mission's 
propaganda plan estimated that the Germans were 
spending three million dollars a month. The Mission 
suggested countering this with a total outlay of five 
and one half million dollars to establish a modern 
news service in Petrograd to provide information for 
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newspapers and periodicals, the publishing of pamphlets, 
a film service, special advertising through posters and 
the like, and to employ "hundreds" of speakers to tour 
the army and the country. The Y.M.C.A., through Dr. 
Mott, offered to establish camps and stations through-
out Russia to provide recreation, reading rooms, lectures, 
movies, various courses, and "highgrade theatrical plays" 
to help improve the morale of the Russian Army. The 
individual reports were basically elaborations of the mate-
rial covered in the main and supplemental reports. Root 
discussed the propaganda campaign, recommended journalist 
John F. Bass to head publicity in Russia, and described 
the Russians as "completely bewildered. 119 
The reports, al·ong with a memo from Dr. Mott 
about publicity were given to Lansing on August 21, 
but the President seems to have had them in his hands 
by the following day when he wrote Mott to thank him. 
Wilson's only comment on his intentions was a simple, 
unspecific, "I want and intend to help. 1110 
It was now ever two and half months since the 
idea of a publicity campaign had first been conceived; 
yet very little action had been taken. Outside of the 
publications of th speeches by Wilson and Root, 
paid for by the members of the Root Mission, only a 
promise to send one and a half million postcards, 
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bearing greetings from America to Russian soldiers, 
had been elicited from the Administration. 11 
What occured during the following period is 
unclear and difficult to document. On August 24 
Colonel Mott called on the President immediately 
prior ro the cabinet meeting of that day. Neither 
Mott nor Ray Stannard Baker's Woodrow Wilson: Life 
and Letters give an account of what was said at this 
t . 12 mee 1ng. Later in the day, presumably after the 
cabinet meeting, the President sent a telegram to 
The Russian National Council Assembly, also known 
as the Moscow State Conference, which was to begin 
meeting on August 25 in Moscow. 13 The message was 
typically ambiguous, expressing hope for "the 
triumph of ideals of democracry for self-government 
against all enemies within and without" and hoped the 
Assembly would give "material and moral assistance 
. . • to the Government of Russia in the promotion 
of the Common cause in which the' two nations are 
unselfishly united. 14 
On August 30, Root, accompained by Dr. Mott and 
Cyrus McCormick, called on the President again to 
discuss their propaganda plans. Wilson's response 
was characteristic. He would give the plan 
"sympathetic consideration 11 15 
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Whether or not a major propaganda campaign of the 
type suggested by the Root Mission would have kept Russia 
in the war and the Bolsheviks out of power can never be 
known. If such a campaign had been started when it was 
first conceived in June the results might well have 
been satisfactory. There is little doubt that the plan 
could have been started in late June or early July. The 
necessary personnel were available, including Russell, 
Washburn, Harper, and by July, Arthur Bullard in Moscow 
and Charles Smith in Petrograa. 16 Russell, Washburn, 
and Bullard were already working on publicity. What 
they needed was money and effective outlets. Obviously, 
the plans for motion pictures and touring speakers re-
quired more time to prepare and the organizational 
abilities of an agency like Creel's Committee on Public 
Information. Nevertheless newspaper outlets existed and 
the Provisional Government must have had influence with 
many of them. Further, with the majorities of the Social 
Revolutionary and Menshevik parties now committed to the 
war, numerous possibilities must be seen to have existed. 
By late August, it was probably entirely too late to 
change Russian public opinion about the war and the 
Provisional Government, or to clarify America's position 
on war aims. Wilson apparently was temporizing, for 
he remained uncommitted to the Root Mission recommenda-
tions on November 10, 1917, three days after the 
Bolshevik revolution. Responding on that date 
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to a letter from Russell, again urging a full-scale 
propaganda effort, the President said that Russell's ideas 
ran "along the lines of my own thought," and that he would 
do his best; but "all sorts of work in Russia now is 
rendered extremely difficult because no one channel 
connects with any other, apparently." Wilson for-
warded Russell's letter to Creel saying it was "a 
very important letter . very near the heart of 
the subject it is concerned with. 1117 
The Mission recommendations had, in the interim, 
been sent to Creel who, according to his memoirs, sup-
ported plans by the Railroad Commission and the Red 
Cross but intially opposed the publicity idea as too 
expensive. Creel ultimately suggested that someone 
be sent to pursue the propaganda campaign "after study." 
On October 27, Edgar Sisson, Editor of Comopolitan 
and nor employed by the Committee on Public Information, 
sailed for Russia. He arrived on November 25, several 
weeks after the October Revolution. For a time 
he, assisted by Bullard, attempted to put forward 
the American viewpoint, but by then their efforts were 
of little value. 18 
During the remainder of August and throughout 
September, Root, Russell, and Duncan spoke of their 
experiences on numerous occasions. On August 16, 
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they spoke at the Union League Club in New York. 
Root continued to emphasize the strengths of 
Russia, citing "self-control equaled in few coun-
tries of the world" and an "extraordinary capacity 
for concerted action. 1119 On September 6 Root spoke 
at the convention of the American Bar Association 
at Saratoga, New York. He contended that while 
the Provisional Government had initially lacked 
control over the population and army it had eventu-
ally won over the "reasonable socialists" in the 
soviet and with them the Petrograd garrison. In 
response to the public concern with the July upris-
ing, and the march on Petrograd by General Kornilov 
Root noted that these events had been explained to 
him prior to his departure. They were part of a 
plan to make Kerensky dictator of Russia. One can 
only-imagine the effect in the Russian press of 
this surprising, even incredible, contention. 
There is certainly a possibility that it was 
true and could have been conveyed to Root by any 
number of people he had met with in Russia. The 
lack of political wisdom evidenced by its public 
mention is truly surprising, especially on the part of 
a man of Root's experience and general good judgement. 20 
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The major theme of Charles Edward Russell's 
post-mission speeches and some of Ambassador Root's 
was that of counter-attacking those prominent 
Americans who were still advocating peace. Principle 
among these was Senator LaFollette who had demanded 
that the Allies state their terms and introduced a 
resolution in the senate asking for a peace conference. 
Russell began the counter-attack at the Union League 
Club reception of August 15, when he called LaFollette 
a: "disloyal American that disgraces the Congress of 
the United States", and a "trator in disguise that has 
taken the oath of allengiance and goes to the Senate of the 
United States to do the dirty work of the Kaiser." 
Russell went on to note that LaFbllette's words would 
be repeated on the Field of Mars and cause further 
weakening of Russian resolve. Senator Root joined in 
the attack, calling those who still backed peace 
after the decision for war had been made, "pro-German 
traitors" who "ought to be shot." Former President 
Roosevelt supported this view. 21 
In early September Riga began to fall to a 
German offensive. Russell spoke again in the sixth 
at the Convention of the American Alliance for Labor 
and Democrary in Minneapolis attacking LaFollette and 
his allies, particularly Senators Gronna and Stone, 
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and citing them as the real captors of Riga. 22 Root 
continued the attacks on September 13 in Chicago 
mention no names but calling all arguments against 
23 the war, "enemy arguments. On September 15 Russell 
again attacked LaFollette, Gronna and Stone and 
demanded charges against them for "plain murder. 1124 
It is clear from his book, Russia Unchained, that 
Russell truly believed that anti-war and pacifistic 
statements by prominent Americans would have a serious 
effect on Soviet opinion. It is not within the scope 
of this paper to calculate the effect of the words 
and actions of LaFollette, Gronna, Stone and others. 
nevertheless Charles Russell was one of a very few 
Americans who had been to the Soviet and seen the 
effect of similar statements and actions in the 
. 25 American press. 
Internally, the Root Mission had been a model of 
unity~ With some relatively minor exceptions the 
menbers worked together with "terrific spirit" and 
without quarre1. 26 This internal harmony must be 
attributed to the influence of Elihu Root. From all 
accounts the members of the Root Mission thought 
highly of the performance of the former Secretary of 
state. 27 Charles Russell believed that Root was in 
danger for his life during much of the trip; yet "he 
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bore himself throughout with a dignified and tranquil 
composure that moved us all to admiration." Further, 
"his personal kindness, unfailing wit, and genial 
acquiesence in whatsoever hardship or difficulty won 
all our hearts, however, we might differ from his 
views. 1128 Admiral Glennon is said to have told 
Josephus Daniels that he had "never heard more patrio-
tic Or wiser utterances in support of the true demo-
cratic spirit" than those of Root. 29 James Duncan also 
praised the Mission's leader. 30 
Despite this general harmony within the Root Mis-
sion, Root, and his friends, questioned the President's 
motives throughout the episode. According to his bio-
grapher, Phillip c. Jessup, Root felt that 
"Wilson didn't want to accomplish anything. 
It was a grand-stand play. He wanted to 
show his sympathy for the Russian Revolution. 
When we delivered his message and made our 31 
speeches, he was satisfied; that's all he wanted." 
Further Root suspected that Wilson hadn't even read 
the Ambassadors' dispatches regarding the publicity 
campaign. 32 Nevertheless, Colonel Mott contended that 
he had never heard Root speak of Wilson in anything 
except "a spirit of entire objectivity."33 Given the 
President's unsupportive behavior and the absence of 
a documentable explanation for it, it is understandable 
that Root and his compatriots would think that their 
work had been futile and that the President had used them. 
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thus decided to await the return of the Root Mission. 
This would not, of course, ans~er the question of the 
half-hearted effort that was made but would explain 
its delay. 
CONCLUSION 
-15&-
Whether the Root Mission can be expected to 
have had a significant impact on the Russia of 1917 
is of course open to question. The fundamental 
problems which lay behind its inability to win over 
the Russian populace to a continuation of the war 
were massive. They included the basic ignorance of 
President Wilson and his closest advisors as to the 
power and influence of the Russian socialists; the 
failure of the President to make a clear, concise 
declaration of American war aims, which helped to 
undermine the Mission and America's credibility; and 
the practical inability of a small party of partially 
discredited Americans, having only tenuous adminis-
trative support, to overcome an apparently massive 
combination of German and Bolshevik propaganda. 
President Wilson and Secretary of State Lansing 
had an extremely limited knowledge of Russia. In 
addition most, if not all, of their advisors failed 
to realize the advances that had been made by the 
various socialist groups in that country. The blame 
for this failure must be placed in part on the 
inadequacy of the American intelligence gathering 
system in Russia and the poor communications system. 
It was clearly a mistake for the President 
to have relied on the initial analysis of Charles 
crane and Samuel Harper. It is obvious that neither 
I- ------------------------------
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had, during March, April, and May, and adequate under-
standing of the defacto:EX>wer enjoyed by the Petrograd 
Soviet and the workers, soldiers, and sailors of 
Russia. In light of the conservative make-up of the 
Provisional Government and the fact that neither man had 
been able to see the situation first hand, their lack 
of perception is understandable. The plain fact of 
the matter is that no one in the administration or 
among the Western Allies knew what was happening and 
mistakenly viewed the March Revolution as a triumph of 
liberal-nationalism. 
It was this failure to recognize the influence 
of the socialists coupled with Lansing's basic 
conservatism, and the domestic political considerations 
of the administration that caused the selection of men, 
who despite their general good intentions and sympathy 
for Russia, were almost inevitably to be viewed with 
at best a suspicious eye by the Russian socialists. 
The choice of Root was clearly a mistake. Although 
the Bloshevik, German, and socialist attacks on his 
character were clearly unfair, the former Senator was 
obviously too closely tied to conservative Republican 
and eastern corporate interests to have been given a 
fair hearing in much of Russia. Despite this fact he 
demonstrated genuine sympathy for the country and 
performed admirably as head of the Mission. Unfortunately 
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he was, in a purely political sense, the wrong man 
for the job. Either Roosevelt or Bryan would have 
been superior and the failure of Wilson to choose 
Bryan remains a mystery. Many of the other members 
of the Mission appear to have reflected the domestic 
political concerns and to have been drawn from back-
ground that were too conservative to be influential 
with the defacto powers in Russia. It should, 
however, be noted that they were selected prior to 
the ouster of Milyukov and Guchkov and the resultant 
bourgeoisie-socialist coaliation was established. 
Even when the necessity of influencing the Russian 
socialist groups began to be recognized, Wilson and 
his advisors failed to come up with Americans who 
could properly be expected to do so. James Duncan 
was clearly a domestic political choice whose member-
ship in the American Federation of Labor automatically 
alienated significant nmnbers of Russian socialists. 
Charles Edward Russell might well have been an 
excellent choice had it not been for the attacks made 
upon him by the Socialist Party of America and certain 
Russian refugee groups. These groups and the Russian 
far lest appear to have succeeded on largely discredit-
ing Russell even before his arrival in Petrograd. 
The result of this unfortunate occurance was that 
the American Mission had no representative whose 
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political image could be expected to significantly 
influence the Soviet. The Root Mission was thus 
most probably politically unexceptable to the 
Russian left from the outset. Despite this fact it 
was well received by the government and other more 
conservative circles and might still have been able to 
win over a majority of Russian popular opinion had it 
been able to express concurrence with the socialist 
viewpoint regarding war aims and eventual peace terms. 
President Wilson had decided for political reasonss, 
not to discuss these issues and, when he ordered the 
Root Mission to refrain from speaking to them entirely, 
the Americans' chances of winning over a majority of 
Russians must be seen to have declined significantly. 
That this policy continued despite the please of 
Kerensky, Charles Crane, and Ambassador Francis, 
which were delivered through Lincoln Steffens, is some-
what surprising. This is particularly because of the 
purported influence of Crane. It cannot be demon-
strated that the British and French would not have 
gone along with public concessions to the Russian left, 
nor can it be demonstrated that a significant offensive 
by Wilson, the Mission, or both, on these important 
issues, would not have persuaded the Russian masses 
to continue their efforts. Once the decision not to 
speak to war aims and peace terms had been made the 
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Root Mission was relegated to using the carrot of 
massaive economic assistance and "war for democracy" 
oratory to persuade the Russians to continue. 
Unfortunately these policies and statements had 
little tangible inunediate value for the Russian 
people and the Mission and appear to have been ignored 
by the Russian left. 
In addition it is important to note that the 
Root Mission was by itself too small and insignificant 
to have been expected to have reached the great mass 
of Russian people. Despite the fact that several 
members of the Mission, particularly Admiral Glennon 
and Dr. Mott were given significant opportunities to 
influence large numbers of Russians, these opportunities 
must be considered insignificant when compared to the 
opportunities open to the Bolsheviks, their allies, and 
German agents then at work in Russia. As Charles 
Russell stated, the western powers had been defeated 
on a field that was neither fully nor wisely contested. 
The best and perhaps only way to have done this was 
through a large scale educational campaign such as the 
Root Mission proposed. Had this been undertaken by 
the allies in conjunction with the Provisional Govern-
ment in early June the outcome of the Russian 
Revolutions of 1917 might well have been different. 
rt certainly cannot be said that the ultimate Bolshevik 
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victory seemed improbable. Nevertheless the threat 
was there, and the Root Mission, though fully aware 
of it, was obviously unable, on its own, to have 
significantly opposed such a threat without a large 
scale educational campaign and strong allied and 
administration backing. The plain fact of the matter 
was that the Russian people were tired of war and 
were understandably more interested in fundamental 
internal reforms. 
The most unfortunate aspect of the Root Mission 
was that its members, particularly Root, Dr. Mott, and 
Admiral Glennon, performed well, knew what was needed, 
and yet were unable to do much about the problems that 
they saw. To the degree that America could have 
influenced Russia, the Root Mission's failure to do so 
must largely be seen as a lack of administration 
support. The Wilson Administration was clearly pre-
pared to dole out large sums of money and war material 
to the Russians but was simply unworthy to commit 
itself to a massive effort to win the hearts and 
minds of the Russian people. As for the performance of 
the Mission as a whole it was cohesive. 
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